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Three Essays on Social Insurance 
 
Jessica Ya Sun 
 
Abstract 
This dissertation consists of three chapters on the economics of social insurance. 
Each chapter explores an aspect of the evaluation and design of social insurance in 
terms of nutrition, healthcare and unemployment. 
 The first chapter, Kim, Fleisher and Sun (2016) report evidence of long-term 
adverse health impacts of fetal malnutrition exposure of middle-aged survivors of the 
1959-1961 China Famine using data from the China Health and Retirement 
Longitudinal Study. We find that fetal exposure to malnutrition has large and long-
lasting impacts on both physical health and cognitive abilities, including the risks of 
suffering a stroke, physical disabilities in speech, walking and vision, and measures of 
mental acuity even half a century after a tragic event. Our findings imply that policies 
and programs that improve the nutritional status of pregnant women yield benefits on 
the health of a fetus that extend through the life cycle in the form of reduced physical 
and mental impairment. 
 In Chapter 2, I evaluate the welfare benefits of the New Cooperative Medical 
Scheme (NCMS), the main public health insurance plan for the rural population in 
China. I find that the value of the NCMS to recipients is slightly higher than the 
government’s costs of implementation. Household benefits from the insurance through 
its value in transfer and insurance function. The estimated moral hazard costs are small 
compared to the total benefits. The findings suggest that behavioral changes due to 
health insurance (i.e. increase of medical service utilization) are in large welfare 
improving among low-income households.  
  In Chapter 3, I examine the effect of a two-tiered unemployment insurance 
system, combining both the UISA and the current unemployment insurance. 
Unemployment insurance savings account (UISA) is a mandatory individual savings 
accounts that can be used only during unemployment or retirement. Different from 
unemployment insurance, UISA does not lead to moral hazard problem but also 
provide no public insurance to workers. Workers are mandated to save when 
employed and can withdraw from the account when unemployed. Once the account is 
exhausted, the unemployed worker receives the usual unemployment benefits. The 
two-tiered unemployment insurance works more efficiently than an unemployment 
insurance system since it provides government benefits only to individuals who are 
not capable of consumption smoothing themselves. Fitting the model to the US 
economy, I find that, relative to the existing unemployment insurance system, the 
proposed two-tiered unemployment insurance leads to a welfare gain of 1% and 
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1.1 Introduction 
Malnutrition among pregnant women and children has been a long-standing 
problem in developing countries. For example, China, although achieving impressive 
economic development, still has more than 120 million individuals suffering from 
malnutrition and 7.2 million children with stunted growth (Chen, 2013). The ‘Fetal 
Origins Hypothesis’ of Barker (1990) and much subsequent work argue that fetal 
malnutrition ‘programs’ the fetus with metabolic characteristics that can lead to future 
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diseases. In the absence of human-subject randomized con-trolled experiments that 
might establish a causal link between fetal malnutrition and later life health outcomes, 
historical events such as the Dutch Famine of 1944 (Roseboom et al., 2001; Scholte et 
al., 2015) have provided researchers with data permitting the study of the long-term 
effects of fetal malnutrition. The 1959–1961 China Great Leap Forward Famine 
(hereafter China Famine), being the worst famine in human history, caused about 30 
million excess deaths (Li and Yang, 2005). The dramatic differences in famine intensity 
across cohorts and regions make the China Famine a particularly well-suited quasi-
natural experiment to identify the causal influences of fetal exposure to malnutrition on 
subsequent physical and mental health outcomes. 
We contribute to the literature by examining the long-term health effects of fetal 
malnutrition in a recently avail-able and large sample of China Famine survivors who 
were in their 50s by the time of the survey. Studies have shown that infants who 
experienced malnutrition during the fetal period may be born with normal birth weight 
and birth size but appear to suffer from various diseases, such as cardiovascular 
diseases, diabetes, and breast cancer in a later stage of life, because the initial 
adaptations of DNA to help the survival of a fetus can trigger health problems in later 
adulthood (Scholte et al., 2015; Lumey et al., 2011; Schulz, 2010). For example, the 
Dutch 
Famine studies suggest that the adverse influences of in utero exposure to 
malnutrition on cognitive abilities be-came obvious when survivors turned into their 
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50s, even though no significant effects were seen during their 20s (Stein et al., 1972; 
Scholte et al., 2015). The delayed effects of prenatal influences are likely to have 
prevented earlier studies of the China Famine from identifying the full negative 
consequences of fetal malnutrition, because the age range of famine victims in earlier 
studies was largely younger than 40 years of age. 
Half a century after the event, we are now able to examine the long-term 
impacts of in utero malnutrition on health outcomes of the survivors in their middle age 
with nationwide panel data on the Chinese elderly, called the China Health and 
Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS). CHARLS is a biannual panel survey that 
began in 2011 and collects rich information on a wide array of detailed objective and 
subjective health measures of a representative national sample of individuals who were 
aged 45 and over in China. CHARLS has much richer information on various health 
measures than the China Population Census data and has a much larger sample than the 
China Health and Nutrition Study (CHNS) data. 
There are several studies on the health effects of the China Famine, but they use 
relatively simple measures such as height and weight observed at early adulthood 
(Gorgens et al., 2007; Chen and Zhou, 2007; Meng and Qian, 2009; Fung and Ha, 2010), 
or they look at other health measures using a limited sample (e.g., data obtained from 
a local hospital) (Clair et al., 2005; Xu et al., 2009). There has been little, if any, 
comprehensive evaluation of the occurrence and magnitude of long-term health 
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consequences of the China Famine, and the newly available CHARLS data allow us to 
evaluate these outcomes. 
We identify the long-term health effects of fetal malnutrition using province-
specific and year-specific death rates weighted by birth month as a proxy for the famine 
severity. We find that fetal exposure to the China Famine of individuals born during 
1959–1961 has led to a 23.3% greater likelihood of developing a speech im-pediment, 
a 16% greater likelihood of suffering difficulty in walking, and a 5.1% greater chance 
of developing vision impairment later in life compared with individuals who were born 
before or after the China Famine. We also find that survivors who experienced the 
famine in utero have a higher probability of having suffered from a stroke compared 
with non-famine cohorts. 
Consistent with the findings of the Dutch Famine studies, our results show that 
the survivors of the China Famine have a higher probability of low cognitive function. 
Survivors who experienced the famine in utero tend to perform much worse on simple 
arithmetic calculations and date recall tests. Because pregnancy is the critical period of 
time when the nervous system is developing and the human body of the pregnant 
women prioritizes the survival of a fetus over its brain development, malnutrition 
experience during the gestation can cause defects in the formation of famine survivors’ 
neural system (Schulz, 2010).1 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 1.2, we briefly 
discuss the background of the 1959 – 1961 China Famine and review the related 
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literature. In Section 1.3, we describe the data and report sample statistics. Section 1.4 
lays out our empirical strategy for estimating the long-term effects of fetal malnutrition 
on physical and cognitive outcomes. Section 1.5 presents and discusses the estimation 
results. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
1.2 Brief Background and Related Literature on the 1959-1961 Great Leap 
Forward Famine 
1.2.1. Brief background 
In 1958, the Chinese Communist Party implemented a set of nationwide 
policies, known as the Great Leap Forward Movement, aiming to quickly catch up to 
the level of industrialization of the Soviet Union and the USA (Li and Yang, 2005). 
Available resources were diverted from the agriculture sector to the manufacturing 
sector, and the central government sharply increased grain procurement from the rural 
population for urbanization and export (Lin and Yang, 2000). The excess procurement 
of grain from rural areas, exacerbated by a series1 of severe weather conditions, led to 
a huge decrease in caloric intake of rural residents and thus reduced their physical 
capacity to engage in farm work (Li and Yang, 2005). As a result, grain production 
                                                 
 
1 Animal studies are also in line with our finding. For example, previous lab experiments on rodents show that 
decedents of undernourished mother rats tend to have fewer brain cells than decedents of normally nourished 
mother rats (Strauss, 1997) 
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dropped substa-tially, leading to a vicious cycle of malnutrition, lowered labor 
productivity, and further reductions in output of agricultural products worsened by 
reduced production incentives (Li and Yang, 2005; Meng and Qian, 2009). 
Compared with the pre-famine production level, national grain output dropped 
by almost 30% in 1960 (Li and Yang, 2005). Exacerbating the impact of lower 
agricultural production, the Chinese central government’s delayed response to the food 
shortage, severe limitations on interregional transfer of grain and other foods, transfer 
of food to the industrial sector’s workers, and ignorance of local conditions (due in part 
to politically motivated over-reporting of grain output) all contributed to turning the 
overall reduction in food availability into probably the worst famine in human history 
as measured by excess deaths. Scholars estimate that the China Famine resulted in 
approximately 23–30 million deaths above what might have been expected under nor-
mal grain production and distribution and 30 million lost births (Chen and Zhou, 2007). 
Although the China Famine was a national phenomenon, the famine intensity varied 
significantly across provinces (Chen and Zhou, 2007). For example, central provinces 
such as Henan, Anhui, and Sichuan were severely affected by the famine, but the 
northeastern provinces were less severely impacted (Almond et al., 2010). Figure 1.1 
shows the annual death rates during the famine period and its geographical variation. 
The Chinese central government eventually recognized the severity of the 
famine and moderated its policies, reducing the transfer of grain from rural areas to 
urban areas and sending millions of people back to the countryside to boost agricultural 
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production, raising the rural labor force by more than 50 million (Li and Yang, 2005). 
By 1961, death rates began to come back to the pre-1959 level in over half of the 
provinces, and birth rates started to rebound as shown in Figure 1.2. 
1.2.2. Related literature 
Most existing studies of the lasting impacts of the China Famine have focused 
on economic outcomes such as labor supply, income, or education attainment (Meng 
and Qian, 2009; Chen and Zhou, 2007; Shi, 2011; Almond et al., 2010; Kim et al., 
2014). Using the 2000 China Population Census Data, Almond et al. (2010) show that 
individuals who experienced the famine in utero are more likely to be illiterate, less 
likely to work, and less likely to get married. Existing research has also found that the 
famine’s impacts are not limited to the first generation. Children who were born to 
famine survivors tend to have fewer years of schooling, higher BMI, and stunted 
heights (Fung and Ha, 2010; Kim et al., 2014; Tan et al., 2014). 
Studies regarding the China Famine’s impacts on health outcomes are relatively 
limited because of the avail-ability of the data. Only simple health measures such as 
height, weight, and BMI were examined at relatively young ages (20s to 30s) (Chen 
and Zhou, 2007; Meng and Qian, 2009; Fung and Ha, 2010). It was shown that fetal 
exposure to malnutrition is associated with significant reduction of height and body 
weight (Chen and Zhou, 2007; Meng and Qian, 2009). Although height and weight are 
indicators of famine survivors’ health conditions, they provide very rough indicators of 
the famine’s influences on detailed health outcomes such as hypertension, cognitive 
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abilities, mental functions, and other specific health conditions. Our study of the China 
Famine is an effort to fill the gap by examining a rich set of health outcomes and 
providing evidence of fetal malnutrition’s long-lasting impacts in famine survivors’ 
middle age. 
Particularly for mental health, previous studies of the China Famine have 
focused mainly on fetal malnutrition’s impacts on the probability of developing 
schizophrenia (Clair et al., 2005; Xu et al., 2009). Consistent with the Dutch Famine 
studies, exposure to malnutrition in utero is associated with higher risk of schizophrenia 
in survivors’ early adulthood. However, the data for these studies tend to be restricted 
to narrow geographical areas. For example, Clair et al. (2005) and Xu et al. (2009) use 
local hospital records from Anhui and Guangxi autonomous region and thus cannot 
control for region-specific heterogeneity. 
Our paper closely follows Almond et al. (2010) and Kim et al. (2014) in terms 
of the measurement of famine intensity and the identification strategy to estimate the 
long-term effect of fetal malnutrition experience. Both Almond et al. (2010) and Kim 
et al. (2014) use data from the 2000 China Population Census microdata, which provide 
limited information regarding individuals’ health. Therefore, these two papers studied 
outcomes other than health indicators. Almond et al. (2010) mainly focus on the 
socioeconomic outcomes of the famine survivors, and Kim et al. (2014) look at the 
education outcomes of children of the famine survivors. Using the 2013 wave of 
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CHARLS, our paper contributes to the literature by examining the impacts of the China 
Famine on survivors’ health outcomes in middle age. 
1.3 Data 
The CHARLS is a biannual longitudinal survey that collects rich information 
on economic, health, and social conditions for a representative sample of individuals 
in China who were 45 and over in 2011. CHARLS covers 150 counties in 28 provinces, 
and the sample size of the baseline survey is 17,692 individuals (8471 men and women) 
in 10,257 households.2 The first baseline survey was conducted in 2011–2012 and the 
second one in 2013. In our study, we only use the second wave collected in 2013. 
The advantages of using data from CHARLS for our research are that (i) it 
provides a wide array of measures of health and other individual and family 
characteristics; (ii) it focuses on the middle-age and older population, thus providing 
an adequate sample to study long-term health effects; and (iii) it contains the 
individuals’ province of birth information. By comparison, the China Population 
Census would be the best available data in terms of sample size, but the Census asks 
for very little information on health (a single question on self-reported health status). 
The China Health and Nutrition Survey contains comparable information, but its 
                                                 
 
2 Tibet is excluded from sampling. 
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effective sample size for our research is significantly smaller than that of CHARLS, 
because it surveys only nine provinces and covers all age ranges.3 
We construct our sample using the following criteria. First, to include 
substantial time variation in our measure of in utero nutrition, we select those who were 
born from 1954 to 1966, 5 years before and after the China Famine. Second, we restrict 
the sample to those born in rural areas because the famine took place mostly in the rural 
areas. We drop individuals from the provinces where provincial death data are not 
available.4 
Figure 1.3 shows that the size of the cohorts between 1959 and 1961 is much 
smaller than before or after this period, reflecting the increased death rate and the 
lowered birth rate resulting from the famine severity. We observe a continuing drop in 
the number of sample individuals starting in 1958 and then a sharp rebound after 1961. 
This pattern closely mirrors the distributions in birth and death rates in China from 
1954 to 1966. 
                                                 
 
3 In addition, CHNS does not track survey participants who migrate out of the province of 
the initial interview, so it can potentially create a sample selection bias due to the different 
likelihood of migration by ability and health. 
4 Chongqing was previously a part of Sichuan but became a direct-controlled municipality 
in 1997. Therefore, there are no separate provincial death data for Chongqing. In the 
Supporting Information, we report the regression results including those who report 
Chongqing as their birth province by considering their birth province as Sichuan. Our 
results remain robust. 
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The specific definition of the health and cognitive ability variables we use are 
provided as follows:  
1. ‘Speech impediment’ is a binary indicator of self-reported disability in speaking. 
CHARLS asks whether a respondent has any speech impediment. Answering ‘yes’ to 
the question would be recorded as 1 (i.e., having a speech impediment) or 0 otherwise.  
2.‘Difficulty in walking’ is a binary indicator of self-reported physical disability in 
walking. CHARLS asks whether a respondent has any difficulty in walking 100 m. 
Answering ‘yes’ to the question would be recorded as 1 (i.e., having difficulty in 
walking) or 0 otherwise.  
3.‘Vision disability’ is a binary indicator of self-reported disability in vision. CHARLS 
asks the individuals to report whether they have any disabilities in vision. Responding 
yes to the question would be coded as 1 (i.e., having vision disability) or 0 otherwise.  
4.We also use a binary indicator of whether a respondent previously had a stroke 
diagnosed by a doctor. If the respondent answers yes, it is coded as 1 (i.e., had a stroke 
before) or 0 otherwise.  
5. ‘Calculation error’ is a binary indicator of a respondent’s cognitive ability. CHARLS 
asks respondents to perform a simple arithmetic calculation task (subtracting 7 from 
100 consecutively for five times). If a respondent makes an error, calculation error 
would be coded as 1 (and 0 otherwise).  
16 
6.‘Recall error’ is a binary indicator of a respondent’s ability to recall the date. CHARLS 
asks respondents to recall the date of yesterday (month and day). If a respondent 
answers either day or month of yesterday wrong, recall error would be coded as 1 (and 
0 otherwise).  
Sample statistics are reported in Table 1.1. The final sample size after imposing 
the aforementioned selection criteria is 7439; 53% of the sample is female, and 94% of 
the sample is married. The education level of the sample individuals is much higher 
than that of their parents: More than 65% of the sample completed primary school, 
while only 50% of their fathers and 18% of their mothers reached this level. The 
surveyed households on average have 3.45 family members. 
We define total annual working hours as the sum of hours spent on farm work, 
household agricultural work, non-farm employed and self-employed work and unpaid 
family business, and other side jobs in the past year. There is wide dispersion in the 
distribution of annual income and working hours. The mean of annual income is 8183 
yuan with a standard deviation of 21,561. The mean of the annual working hours is 363 
with a standard deviation of 367. There are in total 1740 individuals reporting zero 
annual working hours, accounting for 23.4% of the total sample. The details of how we 
construct total annual working hours are described in the Supporting Information. 
The mean of the weighted death rate (WDR) is 12.22 per 1000 persons with a 
standard deviation of 5.48. One standard deviation of the WDR is slightly smaller than 
the difference of average WDR between famine years (1959–1961) and non-famine 
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years, which is 6.14. For physical disability measures, (i) 0.73% of the sample has a 
speech impediment; (ii) 5.91% of the respondents report vision disability; and (iii) 5.01% 
experienced difficulty in walking. Of the sample, 1.31% reports that they ever had a 
stroke. The size of the sample with cognitive problems is much larger: 42.9% of the 
sample made mistakes in carrying out simple arithmetic tasks, and 57.8% of the 
respondents recall the date incorrectly. 
1.4 Econometric Specification and Empirical Strategy 
Our econometric model is represented by the following equation: 
 
where the subscript i represents an individual, p a birth province, t a birth year, and k a 
birth month. We use the province-year level death rate weighted by months in utero 
during birth year t and year t – 1 as a measure of fetal exposure to malnutrition, 
following Almond et al. (2010) and Kim et al. (2014).5 For example, an individual born 
in January 1960 in Shandong would be assigned 1/9th of Shandong’s 1960s average 
death rate (ADR) and 8/9th of Shandong’s 1959s ADR; for individuals born in 
September to December, the WDR is the same as the birth year’s ADR, because 
                                                 
 
5 Alternatively, one can use a county-specific measure of famine intensity (Meng and Qian, 

















conception occurred in the year of birth. It follows that for those born in the months 








where ADR is the province-specific and year-specific measure of famine intensity, 
equivalent to the number of deaths per 1000 individuals in year t and province p. X, a 
vector of controls, includes other characteristics that might affect current health 
outcomes such as gender and parents’ education. In the regression, we control for 
permanent unobserved province-specific heterogeneity, μp, year-specific unobserved 
heterogeneity invariant across provinces, δt, and month-specific unobserved 
heterogeneity, ϕk. In the absence of confounding factors, can be interpreted as the 
estimated causal effect of fetal exposure to the China Famine on health outcomes.6 The 
                                                 
 
6 Young children could also have been affected by the famine. For example, our sample 
individuals born before the famine experienced mal-nutrition during the infancy period, but 
our measure of in utero famine intensity does not capture such early childhood experience. 
To the extent early infancy famine experience also negatively affects the health of adults, 
our comparison group may lead us to underestimate the magnitude of in utero effects 
compared with a population totally unaffected by in utero or early-childhood malnutrition. 
We do not jointly estimate the in utero famine experience and the early infancy famine 
experience because those two measures are correlated that the resulting multicollinearity 
reduces the statistical power available to test the Barker hypothesis. Because our primary 
goal is to precisely estimate the fetal impacts, we decided to focus on in utero exposure to 
malnutrition. 
19 
following discussion deals with potential confounding factors that would lead to biased 
estimation of β. 7 
1.4.1 Selective mortality  
The most severely impacted individuals are more likely to have died during or 
shortly after the famine. Also, because the China Famine took place over half a century 
ago, those severely impacted individuals who man-aged to survive birth and early life 
are less likely to have survived into middle age. As a result, the famine survivors in our 
sample would be, in general, healthier than the famine victims who are missing because 
of selective deaths. We do not have any information about those who are missing 
because of the famine-caused deaths, so we cannot correct for this bias. However, 
because selective mortality makes our estimates biased toward zero, our estimates of 
the long-run health impacts of the fetal experience to the China Famine can be 
interpreted as the lower bounds of the true effects. 
1.4.2 Selective fertility 
Because of the extreme adverse environmental and nutritional conditions 
during the China Famine, marriages and childbearing were postponed or foregone 
                                                 
 
7 The discussion of econometric issues in estimating the long-run health impacts of early-
life malnutrition is largely taken from Almond et al. (2010) and Kim et al. (2014). 
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through choice and reduced chance of conceiving (Almond et al., 2010; Chen and Zhou, 
2007). Shi (2011) reports that there were about 15 million lost births because of the 
China Famine. Therefore, children born during the famine would have come from 
families with better socio-economic and nutritional conditions. Similar to the bias 
caused by selective mortality, selective fertility during the famine period biases against 
rejecting the null of no impact of fetal exposure to the China Famine. 
Moreover, parents whose childbearing were delayed by the famine appear to 
have offset the birth-rate dip after the famine ended. Figure 1.2 reveals a sharp increase 
in birth rates in 1962, the year after the famine ended. To the extent that the post-famine 
surge in birth rates is attributable to women whose health was impaired by the famine, 
it is likely that children born right after the famine inherited characteristics attributable 
to the famine. Thus, the two fertility selections (positive selection toward less-impacted 
parents during the famine and negative selection right after the famine) would bias our 
estimates against rejecting the null of no in utero impacts of the China Famine on long-
run health outcomes. 
1.4.3 Selective migration 
The intensity of the China Famine varied greatly across provinces. Central 
provinces were the worst hit, while northeastern provinces were relatively spared 
(Almond et al., 2010). Migration from severely impacted areas to less-impacted regions 
was virtually prohibited before 1978. According to Chen and Zhou (2007), 
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interprovincial migration accounted for only 0.3–0.7% of the population at risk 
between 1959 and 1963. 
1.4.4 Measurement error 
We acknowledge that WDR is not a perfect measure of fetal malnutrition. A 
pregnant woman’s caloric intake would be a much better measure, but such information 
is not available. Thus, we argue that WDR is the best available source of information 
on fetal malnutrition shock during the China Famine. Assuming that fetal mal-nutrition 
is a stochastic function of WDR, we use WDR as a proxy for the degree of fetal 
malnutrition. 
Formally, we can write that 
 
would depend on the nature of such differential policy responses, if any. We are not 
aware of systematically different post-famine policy changes across provinces (Meng 
and Qian, 2009). 
1.4.5 Other omitted variables 
One might be concerned that our estimates of the fetal malnutrition impacts are 
confounded by the 1966–1976 Cultural Revolution’s adverse influences. However, the 
Cultural Revolution was mainly an urban phenomenon, while the China Famine was 









We control for the local institutional quality differences in policies that 
contributed to health through a province-fixed effect to the extent that such institutional 
differences are time invariant. Differences across provinces in policies adopted after 
the China Famine could lead to biased estimation, and the direction of the bias would 
depend on the nature of such differential policy responses, if any. We are not aware of 




Table 1.2 presents our estimation results. Standard errors are clustered at the 
province level and reported in parentheses. Note that all specifications include the 
father’s and mother’s education and fixed effects for birth year, birth month, and birth 
province. We also include a female dummy variable to account for potential gender 
differences.8 As discussed in the previous section, we interpret the estimated coefficient 
of WDR as a lower bound of the magnitude of the negative long-term health effects of 
fetal malnutrition. The coefficients reported in Table 1.2 represent the marginal effect 
of a unit change in WDR * 1000 on the probability of a corresponding dependent 
                                                 
 
8 In the Supporting Information, we report the regression results of the subsample analysis 
separately by men and women. 
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variable of interest evaluated at the mean of WDR. 9  In order to show economic 
significance of the famine impact, we also report the effect of one standard deviation 
of WDR on the probability of a corresponding dependent variable in square brackets. 
1.5.1 Regression results 
As hypothesized, in utero exposure to the China Famine has had large and long-
lasting impacts on survivors’ physical health and cognitive abilities. Column (1) of 
Table 1.2 shows that a one standard deviation increases in famine intensity resulted in 
a 0.17 percentage-point increase in the probability of a speech impediment, which is a 
23.3% increase in the likelihood of suffering from this disability compared with the 
average individual. 
Column (2) reports the famine impact on respondents’ evaluations of whether 
they have any trouble walking farther than 100 m. A one standard deviation increase in 
famine intensity is associated with a 0.8 percentage-point increase in the probability of 
difficulty of walking, or about 16% increase in the likelihood of experiencing this 
disability compared with the average. 
                                                 
 
9Sample size varies across different outcome variables because of the missing values in the 
corresponding outcome variables. However, our results are robust even if we use the 
identical sample across different outcome variables (i.e., the sample without missing values 
for all outcome variables). 
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Column (3) further confirms the causal relationship between fetal exposure to 
famine and physical disability: a one standard deviation increase in famine intensity 
increases the probability of developing vision disabilities by a 0.3 percentage-point 
increase, a 5.1% increase in the likelihood compared with the average individual. 
Disabilities in speech, vision, and difficulty in walking cannot only be viewed as direct 
health consequences of prenatal exposure to malnutrition but also as complications of 
other health problems such as stroke. There-fore, we could interpret the results of 
columns (1) to (3) as reflections of adverse impacts of fetal exposure to malnutrition on 
survivors’ general physical health. 
It has been reported that prenatal exposure to malnutrition negatively impacts 
survivors’ cognitive abilities (Barker, 1990). Thus, we examine the relationship 
between fetal malnutrition and cognition outcomes. In CHARLS, respondents were 
asked to perform a series of simple arithmetic calculation tests and a date check test. 
Defining a failure to satisfy either of these tasks as an error, we show in column (4) that 
a one standard deviation increase in famine intensity resulted in a 1.6 percentage-point 
increase in the probability of calculation error, which is a 3.7% increase in the 
likelihood of error in the calculation test; in column (5), we see that a standard deviation 
increase in WDR leads to a 1.3 percentage-point increase in the probability of not 
knowing the correct survey date, which is a 2.2% increase in the likelihood of recall 
error. Interestingly, coefficient estimates on the female dummy are significant for both 
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measures indicating a potential gender difference in impacts from fetal exposure to 
famine on cognitive functions. 
Column (6) reports estimation results for the impact of in utero famine exposure 
on the probability of having suffered from a stroke. We see that a one standard deviation 
increase in famine intensity would lead to a 0.3 percentage-point increase in the 
probability of having had stroke, which amounts to a 22.9% increment of risk compared 
with the mean. This finding shows significant influences of adverse prenatal 
environment on survivors’ cerebrovascular health. 
Our results confirm many findings of the previous literature regarding the 
damaging effects of in utero exposure to malnutrition. However, we do not find 
substantial impact of famine on health measures commonly used in the China Famine 
literature such as height and weight as reported by Chen and Zhou (2007) as well as 
Meng and Qian (2009).10 Neither do we find any statistically significant results for other 
ailments such as heart attack although many coefficients have the expected signs. 
                                                 
 
10 We conjecture that the following reasons can explain the difference between our results 
and the findings of Chen and Zhou (2007) as well as Meng and Qian (2009) regarding 
height and weight. First, we use CHARLS, a nationally representative survey of individuals 
over age 45, while the other two studies use CHNS, which surveys only nine provinces and 
does not keep track of respondents who move out of the survey provinces. Therefore, our 
sample is much bigger in size and more representative. Second, the eligible sample size of 
CHNS as opposed to CHARLS is much smaller. Third, we use the survey conducted in 
2013, while Chen and Zhou (2007) and Meng and Qian (2009) use the CHNS survey 
conducted in 1991 and 1989, respectively. Therefore, the famine effect on height and 
weight in relatively young ages could have become smaller because of age-related factors 
such as height shrinkage at old age as documented in Huang et al. (2013). 
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Because our sample individuals have only reached their middle ages, we might expect 
to observe more precisely estimated impacts on the health problems as they grow older. 
1.5.2 Additional analysis 
Fetal exposure to malnutrition could have impacted survivors through various 
pathways. For example, other than directly influencing survivors’ health through fetal 
exposure to malnutrition, famine could also impact the later-life outcomes through 
education. To examine whether education is a potential pathway to the observed health 
impacts of the famine, we include the sample individual’s own education attainment as 
an additional control in the baseline specification. The regression results are reported 
in Table 1.3. We acknowledge that education attainment can be partially determined 
by the famine exposure, and thus, it might not be an ideal control variable (the so-called 
Bad Control problem discussed in Angrist and Pischke (2009)). Thus, we interpret the 
findings in this analysis as suggestive only at this point. 
After controlling for education attainment, we find that the coefficient estimates 
of WDR become somewhat smaller, suggesting that the negative long-term famine 
impacts can be partially explained by the education channel. The coefficient estimates 
on the education dummies also show that education and health are positively correlated, 
which is consistent with the existing literature. 
To further examine the role of education on the health impacts of the famine, 
we check whether the famine exposure leads to lower education attainment by 
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regressing different measures of education outcomes on WDR. The probit regression 
results on binary indicators of whether a respondent has graduated from a primary 
school, middle school, and high school, respectively, and the ordinary least squares 
regression result on the years of completed schooling are reported in Table 1.4. In 
general, our findings show that fetal malnutrition exposure has negative impacts on an 
individual’s education attainment (except for the middle school graduation) al-though 
the coefficient estimates are not precise.11 Thus, we argue that it is highly probable that 
the famine exposure has an indirect impact on health via the education channel. 
In addition, we conduct various robustness checks. First, we estimate the linear 
model using the ordinary least squares method because our baseline specification is a 
non-linear probit model. Second, we estimate the baseline specification with the ADR, 
instead of the WDR. Third, we run the same set of regression on the urban-born 
population. Fourth, to explore the gender differences in the China Famine’s impacts on 
survivors’ health outcomes, we divide the sample into male and female subsamples and 
run the baseline probit regression on each subsample. Last, we construct two additional 
measures of recall error: whether a respondent can correctly recall the current season 
(Spring, Summer, Autumn, and Winter) at the time of interview and whether self-
evaluated memory is bad or not. We then run the same baseline regression on these two 
                                                 
 
11 Female respondents have significantly lower levels of education compared with male 
respondents. This finding is not surprising when considering China’s son preference, 
especially in rural areas. 
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variables. We report and discuss the regression results of each of the aforementioned 
robustness checks in the Supporting Information.12 
1.6 Conclusion 
We report evidence of long-term adverse health impacts of fetal malnutrition 
based on survivors in their 50s who were born during the 1959–1961 China Famine. 
Our results support the Fetal Origins Hypothesis (Barker, 1990) that in utero shocks 
can alter the activities of the epigenome13 in favor of survival, but only at the cost of a 
higher probability of developing certain diseases in later life stages. We find that fetal 
exposure to malnutrition has large and long-lasting impacts on both physical health and 
cognitive abilities, including the risks of suffering from a stroke, physical disabilities 
in speech, walking and vision, and measures of mental acuity. Our findings on the 
health impacts of fetal malnutrition on middle-age survivors suggest that it should be 
                                                 
 
12 The regression results using ordinary least squares are in general similar to the baseline 
results except that the coefficient estimate of the probability of stroke becomes less 
statistically significant. However, the magnitude is comparable with the baseline probit 
result. Regression results using the ADR are robust to the modification of the measure of 
malnutrition exposure. We also run the same set of regression on urban-born population 
and find the results opposite of prediction. Because the sample size is much smaller, the 
estimated results may suffer from reduced power and measurement errors. 
13 Epigenome can be viewed ‘a series of switches that cause various parts of the genome to 




desirable to trace the changes of health status of the famine survivors as they age into 
later life stages. 
Our study provides evidence supporting policies and programs to improve the 
nutritional status of pregnant women. As implied by one of the United Nations’ 
Millennium Development Goals, maternal health has received increasing attention in 
recent years. For example, Improving Nutrition and Food Safety for China’s Most 
Vulnerable Women and Children, a joint program by the United Nations and the 
Chinese central and local governments, has focused on food-related issues of 1.2 
million children, women of childbearing age, and other at risk populations. It aims to 
reduce mortality and other adverse impacts of malnutrition by providing nutritional 
packages to children and pregnant women (Chen, 2013). Our findings imply that the 
payoffs to such interventions play out much further into the future than evaluation of 









Table 1.1 Summary statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Statistics (SD) 
Proportion married 7439 0.94 (0.23) 
Annual working hours 7376 363 (367) 
Proportion of individuals 
reporting zero annual working 
hours 7439 0.234 (0.423) 
Proportion of the sample 
individual’s father completed 
primary school 7439 0.50 (0.50) 
Proportion of the sample 
individual’s mother completed 
primary school 7439 0.18 (39) 
Proportion of women 7439 0.53 (0.50) 
Proportion of the sample 
individual completed primary 
school 7439 0.65 (0.48) 
Family size 7439 3.45 (1.60) 
Annual income (in 2013 CNY) 7376 8,183 (21,561) 
Weighted death rate (WDR) 7439 12.22 (5.48) 
Health outcome variables     
Speech impediment 7392 0.0073 (0.085) 
Difficulty in walking 7272 0.0501 (0.22) 
Vision disability 7391 0.0591 (0.24) 
Ever had stroke 7087 0.0131 (0.11) 
Calculation error 7393 0.429 (0.50) 







Table 1.2 Probit regression results 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  














           
WDR * 
1000 0.208**  1.20**  0.438** 2.99***  2.34** 0.419*  
 (0.084)  (0.507)  (0.196) (1.28)  (1.08) (0.229)  
 [0.0017]  [0.008]  [0.003] [0.016]  [0.013] [0.003]  
Female _0.0014  0.029***  0.004 0.015***  0.024* 0.0003  
Pseudo-R2 
(0.0013)  (0.005)  (0.005) (0.014)  (0.013) (0.003)  
0.065  0.050  0.072 0.040  0.016 0.061  
Observatio
ns 6878  7089  7227 7228  7228 6852  
We estimate the probit model, and the estimated coefficients represent the marginal 
effects of the independent variables evaluated at the mean on the outcome variables. The 
effects of one standard deviation increase in weighted death rate (WDR) on the 
probability of outcome variables are reported in square brackets. 
Standard errors clustered at provincial level are reported in parentheses. All regression 
results include fixed effects for birth year, birth month, birth province, and father ’s and 
mother’s education.***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1. 
  
Table 1.3 Robustness analysis: inclusion of the respondents’ own education as a 
control 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6)  









error Recall error 
Had 
stroke  
           
WDR 
*1000 0.141**  1.16** 0.381* 2.73*  1.93*  0.398*  
 (0.056)  (0.526) (0.200) (1.64)  (1.01)  (0.213)  
Primary 
school 0.0045***  0.0219*** 0.0892 0.300***  0.251***  0.002  
 (0.001)  (0.004) (0.007) (0.024)  (0.016)  (0.002)  
Middle 
school 0.0067***  0.0212*** 0.021*** 0.428***  0.331***  0.007***  
 (0.001)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.0202)  (0.133)  (0.003)  
Above 
middle 
school 0.0045***  0.0277*** 0.035*** 0.521***  0.342***  0.0015  
 (0.0007)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.018)  (0.012)  (0.003)  
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Female 0.003**  0.022*** 0.004 0.057***  0.057***  0.0005  
Pseudo-R2 
(0.001)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.014)  (0.011)  (0.003)  
0.133  0.06 0.081 0.12  0.069  0.067  
Observation
s 6878  7089 7227 7228  7228  6852  
We estimate the probit model, and the estimated coefficients represent the marginal effects of 
the independent variables evaluated at the mean on the outcome variables. 
Standard errors clustered at provincial level are reported in parentheses. All regression results 
include fixed effects for birth year, birth month, birth province, and father’s and mother’s 
education. 
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1. 
  
 
Table 1.4 Robustness analysis: impacts of WDR on education attainment 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  










 school  school  school  education  
      
WDR * 
1000 _0.232 0.582 _0.366 _0.443  
 (1.15) (1.40) (0.855) (14.3)  
Female 0.026 _0.120*** _0.103*** _2.87***  
(Pseudo-) 
R2 
(0.022) (0.013) (0.008) (0.162)  
0.041 0.060 0.107 0.212  
Observatio
ns 7272 7272 7272 7272  
We estimate the probit model in columns (1) to (3) and the ordinary least squares model in 
column (4). The estimated coefficients represent the marginal effects of the independent 
variables evaluated at the mean on the outcome variables. 
Standard errors clustered at provincial level are reported in parentheses. All regression 
results include fixed effects for birth year, birth month, birth province, and father’s and 
mother’s education. 






















Source: Meng et al. (2014) 








Source: China National Bureau of Statistic 
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Welfare Consequences of Access to Health Insurance: 





Improving access to healthcare and financial protection through health 
insurance program among low-and middle-income households is a key concern for 
policymakers. One of the classic empirical results in public health insurance is that 
demand for healthcare increases due to the lowering of the out-of-pocket price. This 
finding has traditionally been interpreted as evidence of moral hazard: public health 
insurance distorts the relative price of consumption and health, increasing the cost of 
providing insurance. At the same time, health insurance coverage enables individuals 
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to seek medical treatments that are previously not affordable, particularly among low-
income households where the cost of treatment is high relative to income. 
The goal of this paper is to understand the welfare consequences of access to 
health insurance and question whether the link between health insurance and medical 
spending is purely due to moral hazard among low- and middle-income households. 
The analysis is motivated by evidence that many uninsured households in developing 
countries have limited liquidity and adopt costly measures in consumption smoothing 
(Chetty and Looney, 2006,2007; Chetty, 2006; Liu, 2016). Indeed, nearly forty-percent 
of individuals residing in rural areas in China and Health Nutritional Survey (CHNS) 
report not to seek formal medical treatment when fell sick, suggesting that many 
individuals may avoid treatment due to expensive costs. 
In this paper, I evaluate the welfare benefits of access to health insurance by 
exploiting a policy reform associated with the introduction of a large-scale health 
insurance program in rural China. The New Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS) is 
the main public health insurance plan for the rural population in China. Since its 
inception in 2003, access to health insurance for rural residents expanded dramatically 
given the fact that almost none were enrolled in health insurance in rural China (see 
Figure 1) in the 1990s. By the end of 2011, more than 97% of the rural population (800 
million people) had been enrolled in the scheme (Hou et al. 2013). 
Different from the traditional approach of structurally estimating a model’s 
primitives and then numerically simulated the effects of policy changes, I adopt two 
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approaches from Finkelstein et al. (2016): “complete-information” approach and 
“optimization” approach that are in the spirit of the “sufficient statistics” to analyze the 
welfare value. Particularly, I decompose the welfare effect in terms of transfer and 
insurance value, which would provide implications on the sources of welfare as well as 
the size of associated moral hazard costs. Compare to the structural method and 
reduced-form method, the advantages of using the two approaches are: (i) they are 
easier to implement; (ii) they are more empirically credible since program effects are 
estimated using quasi-experimental variations. 
I implement these methods empirically by exploiting variation in the timing of 
introduction of the NCMS across counties to identify the impacts of the NCMS on 
required objects. The NCMS was implemented over a six-year period from 2003 to 
2009 in different counties at different times in rural China. As a result, some areas 
received coverage earlier than others did, and the households in those areas were then 
subject to exogenous changes in health insurance status at different points in time. 
Since participation in the NCMS is voluntary, I use the proportion of households 
enrolled in NCMS at the residential community as an instrumental variable (IV) to 
account for potential adverse selection. Two additional features of the NCMS make the 
identification strategy more appealing. First, because of the household registration 
system, household mobility in China is restricted. Therefore, it is unlikely for 
households to select into the insurance through mobility. Second, the NCMS program 
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was introduced at county level. Combining with the restricted mobility, the potential 
spillover effects will likely to be small. 
The analysis is conducted using panel data from the China Health and 
Nutritional Survey (CHNS). The key findings are as the following. The baseline 
estimates indicate that the value of the NCMS to recipients is higher than the 
government's costs of provision. I estimate that welfare benefit to recipients per (gross) 
RMB of government spending is approximately 1.4. If (counter-factually) the NCMS 
recipients had to pay the government's average cost of the NCMS, they would much 
likely to accept the offer. Contrary to the findings from developed countries, I do not 
find a large proportion of transfers from the NCMS to external parties (i.e. individuals 
who are not enrolled in the program). This is largely because the uninsured in rural 
China typically pay all their medical expenses with little covered by hospitals or any 
other third parties.  
An important question is whether the value of the NCMS to recipients exceeds 
the associated moral hazard costs. By decomposing the welfare estimates, I find that 
welfare value from NCMS's transfer function constitutes 50% to 70% of the total 
benefits. Compare with the net costs of providing the NCMS, I estimate the welfare 
benefits to recipients per net RMB of spending ranges from 1.39 to 1.44. A consistent 
estimate above 1 suggests that the moral hazard costs do not exceed the insurance value 
NCMS provides by moving resources across states of the world. 
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In addition to evaluating the welfare value of the NCMS, this paper contributes 
to the literature by providing welfare interpretation of the previously evaluated 
behavioral impacts of the NCMS. Some studies have found that participating in the 
NCMS has no significant effects on reducing out-of-pocket spending (Lei and Lin, 
2009; Liu and Tsegai, 2011; Hou et al., 2013) or improving health status (Lei and Lin, 
2009; Chen and Jin, 2012; Donato and Rokicki, 2016). In the meanwhile, compare to 
the uninsured, the NCMS enrollees are more likely to seek proper medical advice for 
minor symptoms at early stage (Liu and Tsegai, 2011), decrease the usage of folk 
doctor and increase the utilization of preventive care (Lei and Lin, 2009). Few have 
attempted to offer interpretation in terms of welfare. Among those that do, few papers 
have provided quantitative measurements. 
This paper also contributes to our understanding of welfare effects of access to 
health insurance in developing countries, where formal insurance and credit markets 
are less developed. Closely related to the current paper is a set of papers analyzing the 
role of public insurance in mitigating the adverse outcomes associated with shocks in 
developing countries (e.g. Chetty and Looney, 2006; Wagstaff and Lindelow, 2008; 
Wagstaff et al., 2009; Liu, 2016). This paper adds on to the previous studies by 
quantifying the welfare value of access to public insurance and analyzing the sources 
of welfare benefits. The findings of this paper are consistent with previous literature: 
low- and middle-income households benefit from public insurances through more 
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efficient consumption smoothing instruments compare to the ones (i.e. labour supply) 
used in self-insurance. 
This paper provides important implications for policymakers. Some studies 
have found that the NCMS have limited or adverse effects in financial protection (i.e. 
no effect in reducing out-of-pocket spending (Lei and Lin, 2009; Wagstaff et al., 2009; 
Liu and Tsegai, 2011). The results of this study confirm the previous findings by 
showing that the magnitude of the welfare gains generated from the NCMS's insurance 
function. Though the total welfare benefits are higher than the implementation costs, 
the NCMS's ability in risk protection is limited. High percentage of recipient's value of 
the program come from its insurance function, reflecting the high demand of actuarially 
fair insurances and lack of access to complete credit market among households in rural 
China. To achieve higher welfare benefits, especially for the low-income households, 
the results suggest the need for a more generous NCMS program. 
Naturally, the estimation results are sensitive to the modeling choices. I 
explored the sensitivity of the results to a variety of alternative assumptions. The 
evaluation of the welfare value associated with insurance function is more sensitive to 
modeling assumptions while the transfer values are relatively robust. The welfare value 
estimates are particularly sensitive to the imposed consumption floor. Households with 
better consumption smoothing abilities would place lower values on the insurance 
program. A 300 RMB increase of the imposed consumption floor lowers the benefit-
cost ratio by 40%. 
41 
The rest of the paper proceeds as the following. Section 2 discusses the 
institutional background of the health insurance reform. Section 3 presents the welfare 
analysis framework. Section 4 discusses the empirical strategy. Section 5 describes data, 
sample construction and variables used in the estimation. Section 6 discusses the 
welfare estimation results, interpretation and sensitivity analysis. Section 7 concludes. 
2.2 Institutional Background 
Since its establishment in 1949, the People’s Republic of China has undertaken 
a series of policy measures in providing health care to the public. From 1950 to 1984, 
under the central-planned economy, the Chinese government created state-run health 
care system similar to other communist countries and provided universal health care. 
Agricultural workers were covered by the Commune-based Cooperative Medical 
Scheme (CMS). Workers from state-owned enterprises (SOE) were covered under 
Labor Insurance Scheme (LIS) and civil servants were reimbursed through the 
Government Insurance Scheme (GIS). The CMS covered almost 90% of the rural 
residents in its peak in 1978 (Lei and Lin, 2009).  
However, the Chinese government greatly reduced its role in providing health 
care services with free-market reforms starting from 1984. This radical policy change 
not only led to the dismissal of people’s communes but also the collapse of the CMS. 
As a result, majority of the rural residents remain uninsured through 1985 to 2003 (Hou 
et al., 2014; Lei and Lin, 2009). Figure 2.1 shows the health insurance coverage for 
rural and urban population by income in 1993, 1998 and 2003, respectively. Compared 
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to the urban counterparts, even the highest income quantile of the rural residents has 
much lower insurance coverage, indicating wide inequalities in health insurance 
accessibility. 
To establish universal coverage and improve the affordability of medical 
services, the Chinese government announced the New Cooperative Medical Scheme 
(NCMS) in 2003, a highly subsidized public health insurance program for rural 
residents. The NCMS was rolled out gradually at the county level. Provincial 
governments have the autonomy in program adoption time and designs14 following the 
guidelines from the central government. In 2003, pilot counties were selected at each 
province based on three criteria: the willingness to participate among the rural residents, 
fiscal soundness, and a solid foundation for management (Liu, 2016). The central 
government required provincial governments to expand the program to include at least 
40% of all counties by 2006 and 60% by 2007 (Department of Health, 2006). By the 
end of 2013, 2,489 out of 2,862 counties had adopted the NCMS, accounting for 87% 
of all rural counties in China (Lei and Lin, 2009; China Statistical Yearbook, 2013). 
Thus, over almost a decade, rural households across counties in China had experienced 
different access to public health insurance. The access to coverage was determined by 
                                                 
 
14 The 2002 State Council Policy Document No.13, Decisions of the State Council on 
Strengthening Rural Healthcare (State Council, 2002). 
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the county in which the household was registered. Due to the strict household 
registration system (hukou), mobility of households across counties is limited. 
Enrollment in the NCMS is voluntary but it requires the participation of all 
household members. The NCMS is financed by both individual contributions and 
government subsidies: about 20% covered by central government, 50% by local 
government, and remaining 30% by the household's premium payments (Liu, 2016). 
Though the annual premium is kept low by the heavy subsidization from the 
government, it increases over the years: the typical annual premium was 20 RMB per 
person in 2008 but rose up to 150 RMB per person in 2016 (Department of Health, 
2008; Ministry of Finance, 2016) .The total subsidies from central and local 
government steadily increased over time: from 80 RMB per person in 2008 to 420 
RMB per person in 2016. 
Table 2.1 reports the expansion of the NCMS program in the sample used in 
the analysis15. Column II and III describe the percentage of households had access to 
the NCMS program and enrolled from 1993 to 2011. Column IV shows the percentage 
of counties that have introduced the NCMS in each survey year. Before the first year 
of the implementation of the NCMS, the insurance coverage had been lower than 15%. 
                                                 
 
15 Details of sample construction are discussed in Section 2.5. 
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Starting from 2004, the proportion of rural sample having insurance increased steadily 
from 15.2% to 98.1% in 2011, reflecting the rapid expansion of the NCMS. 
2.3 Welfare Analysis Framework 
Following Finkelstein et al. (2016), individual utility is derived from two components: 
non-medical goods consumption, c, and from health, h, following the utility function: 
𝑢 = 𝑢(𝑐, ℎ)   (1). 
Health is produced according to 
ℎ = ℎ̃(𝑚; 𝜋)   (2), 
where m is the medical spending and 𝜋 represents the existence of health shocks. In 
general, I assume that an individual’s health is affected by a health shock and medical 
expenditures.  
 The presence of the NCMS is represented by the variable q, with q = 1 
indicating that the individual is fully covered by the NCMS and q = 0 denoting no 
coverage. Consumption, medical expenditure and health are determined by NCMS 
status and the underlying state of the world. 
The value of the NCMS, 𝛾(𝑞), is defined as the implicit solution to: 
𝐸[𝑢(𝑐(0; 𝜋), ℎ(0, 𝜋)] = 𝐸[𝑢(𝑐(𝑞; 𝜋) − 𝛾(𝑞)), ℎ(𝑞, 𝜋)],  (3) 
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where expectations are taken over the probability distribution of the underlying states 
of the world, 𝜋. 𝛾(𝑞) could be interpreted as the amount of consumption that would 
leave individuals indifferent in terms of expected utility between the world with the 
NCMS and the world without. The focus of the paper is to empirically estimate the 
value of 𝛾(𝑞). 
2.3.1 Complete Information Approach 
The complete-information approach follows the spirit of structural estimation, 
specifying the normative utility function over all its arguments. I assume that the utility 




+ ?̃?ℎ       (4), 
where σ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, 𝜙 = ?̃?/𝐸[𝑐−𝜎]  is the marginal 
value of health in units of consumption.   
The utility function has two additive components: a standard CRRA function in 
consumption c with a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 𝜎, and a linear term in h. 




+ ?̃?ℎ(0, 𝜋)] = 𝐸 [
(𝑐(𝑞,𝜋)−𝛾(𝑞))1−𝜎
1−𝜎
+ ?̃?ℎ(𝑞, 𝜋)].   (5) 
I use equation (5) to solve for the value of the NCMS 𝛾(𝑞). The estimation requires 
observing the distributions of consumption and expected health status that would occur 
if the individual were on the NCMS and if he were not. One of them is a counter-factual 
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of the other and therefore requires estimating the distributions of "potential outcomes" 
under treatment and control status.  
The choice of the utility function naturally influences the estimation procedures 
and results. The additivity of utility function from consumption and health makes 
estimating the marginal consumption and marginal health distributions under each 
insurance status easier. Imposing complementarity between consumption and health is 
empirically feasible but more cumbersome to implement since it requires estimating 
the program influences on joint distributions. The linearity assumption in health, h 
restricts the estimation to average treatment effects. To capture the risk adverse nature 
of the individuals, I allow curvature in utility over consumption, which requires 
estimation of the distribution of consumption under each insurance status. 
To reflect the sources of benefits from the NCMS program, I decompose 𝛾(𝑞) 
into two components: (i) the transfer component, which reflects the average increases 
in available resources to the recipients; and (ii) the pure-insurance component, which 
captures the value from better allocation of resources across states of the world. 





+ ?̃?𝐸[ℎ̃(𝐸(𝑚(0, 𝜋), 𝜋)]] = 𝐸 [
(𝑐(𝑞,𝜋)−𝑇)1−𝜎
1−𝜎
+ ?̃?ℎ̃(𝐸(𝑚(𝑞, 𝜋), 𝜋)].    (6) 
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The health improvement is approximated as 𝐸 [
𝑑ℎ̃
𝑑𝑚




] is the slope of the health production function between 𝑚(𝑞, 𝜋) and 𝑚(0, 𝜋), 
averaged over all states of the world. Details in estimation of 
𝑑ℎ̃
𝑑𝑚
 are described in 
Appendix A.2. The transfer component represents the changes in utility from 
consumption and health if everyone has received the average increase in medical 
spending.  
The pure-insurance term, denoted by I, is given by: 
𝐼 = 𝛾(𝑞) − 𝑇.      (7) 
The pure-insurance term measures the value of the NCMS that results from the 
reallocation resources (i.e, relaxing the individual budget constraint) from lower-
marginal utility states to higher ones. 
2.3.2 Optimization Approach 
To reduce the implementation requirements, I assume two additional economic 
assumptions under the optimization approach which allows me to estimate the value of 
the program without full specification of the utility function. 
Assumption 1. (Program structure) I model the NCMS program q as affecting 
the participants solely through its impact on the out-of-pocket expenditure p(q). 
Assumption 2.  Individuals choose m and c optimally, subject to their budget 
constraint. Individuals solve: 
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𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑐.𝑚𝑢(𝑐, ℎ) subjective to 𝑐 = 𝑦 − 𝑥(𝑞, 𝑚)   ∀𝑚, 𝑞 
where y denotes the household income. 
 Both assumptions are nontrivial under the context of health insurance especially 
since decisions are often made jointly by both enrollees and health providers (e.g., 
doctors). Providing health insurance may influence the provider behavior (e.g., 
providers are more likely to proscribe expensive treatments to patients with insurance). 
For implementation purposes, I assume that the out-of-pocket spending on 
medical care follows: 
𝑥(𝑞, 𝑚) = 𝑝(𝑞)𝑚    (8). 
Defining out-of-pocket price 𝑝(𝑞) as 𝑝(𝑞) = 𝑞𝑝(1) + (1 − 𝑞)𝑝(𝑞), the out-of-pocket 
spending could be represented as: 
𝑥(𝑞, 𝑚) = 𝑞𝑝(1)𝑚 + (1 − 𝑞)𝑝(𝑞)𝑚   (9). 













)]    (10) 
where 𝑢𝑐 represents the partial derivative of utility with respect to consumption. Details 
of derivation are provided in Online Appendix A.1. Equation (10) uses the marginal 
utility of consumption to place a value on the relaxation of the budget constraint for 
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each state of the world. A marginal increase in the NCMS’s benefit has more value if 
it moves resources into the state of the world with higher marginal utility of 
consumption. Compared to the complete-information approach, the optimization 
approach only requires a partial specification of the utility function with regard to 
consumption since under assumption 2, individuals are indifferent between allocating 
the marginal increase of the NCMS benefits for consumption or for health. The non-
marginal estimate of the total welfare value of the NCMS, 𝛾(𝑞)  is obtained by 












+ 𝑣(ℎ)    (11) 
where 𝜎 represents the coefficient of relative risk aversion and 𝑣(. ) is the sub-utility 
function for health, which is left unspecified. Combining with equation (9), equation 









(𝑝(0) − 𝑝(𝑞))𝑚(𝑞))]  (12). 
I decompose the marginal value of the NCMS to the recipients into a transfer term (T) 












(𝑝(0) − 𝑝(𝑞))𝑚(𝑞))] .  
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Since I do not observe all 𝑞 ∈ [0,1] and the intermediate values, the calculation of the 
non-marginal estimate of the total welfare value of the NCMS requires additional 
assumption. For the baseline estimation of the optimization approach, I make the 
following statistical assumption. 












2.3.3 The costs of the NCMS 
I benchmark the welfare estimates, 𝛾(𝑞), against the government’s costs of 
implementation. For this paper, I consider only the medical expenditures when 
estimating the program costs. This abstracts from any potential administrative costs 
associated with the NCMS. Under this assumption, the average cost to the government 
per recipient, which I donate as G, is  
𝐺 = 𝐸[𝑚(𝑞) − 𝑥(𝑞)]  (15). 
This gross cost per enrolled family, G, is higher than the net cost to society. The net 
cost of the NCMS, which is denoted by C, is: 
𝐶 = 𝐸[𝑚(𝑞) − 𝑚(0)] + 𝐸[𝑥(0) − 𝑥(𝑞)]   (16). 
Net cost per recipient consists of the average increase in medical spending induced by 
the NCMS, plus the average decrease in out-of-pocket expenditure due to the NCMS. 
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2.4 Empirical Strategy 
To identify the effects of enrolling in the NCMS on the outcome variables, I adopt the 
instrumental variable (IV) estimation strategy. It is modeled as follows: 
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑁𝐶𝑀𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜆𝑗 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡   (17) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the outcome of interest for household i residing in county j at year t. 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 
includes a set of demographic variables, including log household size, share of children 
in the household, share of working-age adults in the household, age and age-squared of 
the household head, indicators for the education level of the household head, and 
whether the household head is single. 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡  controls for the effects of household 
demographics on the outcome of interest. 𝜆𝑗 and 𝜆𝑡 are county and year fixed effects, 
respectively. The county fixed effects 𝜆𝑗 allow the fact that variation in the timing of 
the reform across counties may not have been exogeneous. The year fixed effects 𝜆𝑡 
control the unobserved household characters over time that may be completely 
unrelated to the reform. 𝜆𝑗  are county fixed effects, which control for the average 
change in outcomes across all households or the change in aggregate resources within 
a county. 𝑁𝐶𝑀𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a dummy variable indicating whether the household i enrolled in 
the NCMS in year t at county j. To capture any common influences to the outcome 
variable across households within the county and over time, standard errors are 
clustered at county level. 
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The coefficient of interest is 𝛼1, the impacts of participating in the NCMS on 
the outcome variable. One major concern with equation (17) is that enrolment in the 
insurance could be endogenous since participating in the NCMS is voluntary. 
Households with existing health concerns may be more likely to participate than the 
ones without. To account for endogeneity of participation in the scheme, I adopt an 
instrumental variable strategy using the same set of control variables in equation (17). 
Recent studies suggest that an individual’s peers and social interactions play a key role 
in adopting health products and taking up of social programs (Kremer and Miguel, 2007; 
Oster and Thornton, 2011; Dahl et al, 2015). The information transmission about costs 
and benefits among peers increases the likelihood of program participation. Following 
Cheung and Padieu (2015), I use the percentage of recipients in the community, 
excluding the observed household, as the instrument variable. The underlying 
assumption is that the higher the coverage in the community, the more credible and 
attractive the insurance is to households. The participation rate in the community 
influences the household’s decision in enrolling in the NCMS but has no direct effects 
on the outcome variables. 
The roll-out structure of the NCMS makes the identification strategy more 
appealing. The program was implemented over a six-year period from 2003 and 2009 
in different counties at different times in rural China. Some areas received coverage 
earlier than others did, and the households residing in those areas were subject to 
exogenous changes in health insurance offering status at different times. In addition, 
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the household registration (hukou) system in China restricts household mobility and 
makes selective mobility very unlikely. Therefore, households residing in a community 
could only enroll in the program if the NCMS was offered in the residential county. 
Together with the restricted mobility, the potential spillover effects are likely to be 
small. 
Previous studies identifying the local average treatment effect (LATE) of the 
NCMS have adopted two other instrumental variables: county offer status (Lei and Lin, 
2009), duration of community-level NCMS availability (Donato and Rokicki, 2016). 
All three IVs captures the relationship between the availability of the insurance and 
household participation. Using county NCMS offer status suffers from the critique that 
the IV may influence the outcome variable directly if the county implementation 
decision is correlated with the local economy level. Duration of community-level 
NCMS fails to capture the unobserved program intensity and credibility along time, 
leading to a potentially weak correlation with the household participation decision. 
Results using the other two IVs are available in Appendix A.3. 
2.3 Data 
I use data from the China Health and Nutritional Survey (CHNS). The CHNS 
began in 1989 and has eight subsequent waves in 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006 
and 2011. It is based on a multistage, random cluster process that results in a sample of 
approximately 4,400 households with 19,000 individuals over the survey periods. It 
covers nine provinces (Guangxi, Heilongjiang, Guizhou, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, 
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Jiangsu, Liaoning, and Shandong) that vary considerably in terms of geography, 
economic development and public resources.  
In this study, I use data from 1993 to 2011, covering the entire duration of the 
health insurance reform. Since enrolment in the NCMS is at the household level, the 
unit of observation under analysis is the household. I use the following criteria for 
sample selection. First, I restrict the sample to be rural households, whose household 
head lives in a rural county and has a rural hukou16. Second, I exclude observations 
with missing information on key variables such as insurance enrollment status, county-
level NCMS offer status, and education status of the household head. 
Following Lei and Lin (2009), the year of the county level implementation is 
determined by community survey data from the CHNS. Government officials from 
each community were surveyed on whether the CMS had been implemented in their 
community, and if so, the starting date. Since the NCMS started from 2003, counties 
with CMS status before 2003 were implementing the old CMS. CMS plans that 
implemented after 2003 are defined as the NCMS. Since the NCMS operates at the 
                                                 
 
16 Hukou is a residential registration system in China. Only individuals with 
rural hukou could participate in the NCMS. 
55 
county level, if any community within a county was known to have adopted the NCMS, 
the county as a whole was defined as having implemented the NCMS. 
Table 2.2 Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the households used in the 
empirical analysis. The first column reports results for the whole population. Column 
2 and 3 describe results for households without and with enrolment in the NCMS. 
Compared to the household with the NCMS, the head of the households without the 
NCMS tends to be younger, more likely to be a single, and less likely to achieve at least 
nine years of education. Households with the NCMS are smaller in size, have lower 
share of children and have a much higher total annual household income compared to 
those without.  
In the rest of the section, I will first focus on outcome variables that are 
relatively easy to measure: medical spending (m), out-of-pocket spending (x), and out-
of-pocket price (p). Then I will describe the estimation of monetized value of health (h) 
and consumption (c). The measure of consumption available from the CHNS is food 
consumption. However, the monetary value of the food consumption is not directly 
available from the data. Therefore, estimation of health and consumption requires 
additional assumptions. Table 2.2 Panel B presents summary statistics on key outcome 
variables in this study. 
Medical spending m.  The CHNS surveys respondents regarding their medical services 
utilization. The medical spending includes the costs of treating the same illness used to 
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define the health shock at up to two clinics or hospitals, as well as the cost of informal 
treatment if the individual chooses to use informal care (i.e. did not go to a clinic). 17 
The household level medical spending is measured as the sum of all medical 
spending incurred by the household members. On average, monthly medical spending 
is about 308 RMB for households with NCMS and 112.9 RMB for households without. 
Out-of-pocket spending  x.  The household out-of-pocket spending is derived from 
the same set of questions as the medical spending. The CHNS surveys respondents 
about the proportion of the cost paid by the insurance. The household out-of-pocket 
spending is measured as the sum of all out-of-pocket spending incurred by the 
household members. The average monthly out-of-pocket medical expenditure for 
households with the NCMS is 293.6 RMB and 484.6 RMB for those without. 
Out-of-pocket prices  p. The optimization approach requires the definition of the out-
of-pocket price of medical care with the NCMS, p(q), and without, p(0). I measure the 
price of medical care p(q) as the ratio of mean out-of-pocket spending to mean total 
                                                 
 
17 The first question asks what did the respondents do if the respondent reported being sick 
in the past four weeks. If the respondent reports self-care or visit local health worker, the 
second question asks the amount of total costs incurred. If the respondent reports seeing a 
doctor, the third question records the amount of total spending in hospital, which includes 
registration fees, medicines, treatment fees etc. If the respondent reports seeking a second 
health facility regarding the same illness, the total amount of medical spending is also 
recorded. The fifth question asks the amount of additional costs incurred in treating the same 
diseases. The four questions are available in all waves of the survey for every respondent 





. I estimate p(0) = 0.99 and p(q) = 0.75. In other words, the 
uninsured pay almost the whole amount of their medical spending while the insured 
only pay 0.75 on 1 RMB for their medical spending. 
2.3.1 Measuring requisite health (h) inputs 
The complete-information approach requires estimation of the impact of the 
NCMS on health. There are several measures of health in the CHNS data. For the 
baseline analysis, I adopt the specification in Liu (2016). The household health status 
is derived from two questions in the survey. The first question asks whether the 
individual, during the past four weeks, had suffered from any illness; if yes, the second 
question records the number of days that the person had been unable to carry out daily 
activities due to the illness in the same period18. Both questions are available in all 
waves of the survey for every respondent aged 18 years or older19. 
The household-level health status is measured as the proportion of time in the 
past four weeks (in percentage points) that the household suffers from a severe illness: 
                                                 
 
18 The survey questions are: “During the past four weeks, have you been sick or injured? 
Have you suffered from a chronic or acute disease?” and “For how many days during the 
past four weeks were you unable to carry out normal activities due to this illness?” 
19 Self-assessed health status question is available in the CHNS but only from wave 1997 to 
wave 2006. Another potential measure is the self-reported ability to perform daily activities. 
However, the CHNS only collects data on physical limitations for individuals aged 55 and 







× 100     (18), 
where 𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑚  measures the number of days in the past four weeks household members 
reported severe illness. The household health status is defined as a normalization over 
the length of the recall period (28 days). On average, households with the NCMS 
experience 0.884 days of sickness in the past four weeks while households without the 
NCMS experience 0.721 days. 
Measuring health as the capacity to perform daily activities among all 
household members for rural households in China captures not only the benefits from 
improved health condition but also partially the benefits of avoiding inefficient 
insurance mechanisms. Recent literature has shown that household labor supply is an 
important insurance mechanism against health shocks among low-income households 
(Chetty and Looney, 2006; Chetty, 2006). Absent of health insurance, during a negative 
health shock, households tend to reduce investment in children’s education and 
increase the use of child employment (Liu,2016). Evaluating health as the number of 
days that adult household members are unable to work indirectly captures the 
insurance’s effects on labor supply.  
A key challenge for welfare analysis is how to value changes in a given measure 
of health. With the health measure as the number of days unable to work, the standard 
approach is to evaluate using the hourly wage rate. Majority of the rural households in 
China do not engage in formal employment and many work on family business (e.g. 
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agriculture work, raising livestock). The CHNS provides annual household income and 
thus I measure the value of a labor day as 𝜙 =
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
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, where 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the annual household 
income of household i residing in county j at wave t.  
2.3.2 Measuring requisite consumption (c) inputs 
Both complete-information approach and optimization approach require 
measurement of consumption. The complete-information approach requires to estimate 
the impact of the NCMS on the distribution of consumption. And the optimization 
approach requires estimation of the joint distribution of consumption and out-of-pocket 
spending. 
As a survey designed to track the nutritional intake of the respondents, the 
CHNS records food consumption as the amount of calorie intakes. Monetary value of 
the food consumption is, however, not directly available from the data. In this study, I 
proxy for non-medical household consumption c as the difference between total 
household income and out-of-pocket medical expenditure: 
𝑐 = 𝑦 − 𝑥    (19). 
The consumption proxy assumes that each household member is entitled to 
same amount of consumption, i.e., the impact of a given amount of out-of-pocket 
expenditure on non-medical consumption is shared equally within household. This 
assumption is reasonable under the context of rural China given the joint nature in 
household consumption and labor supply. In the sensitivity analysis, I also report 
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results in which I assume the other extreme: the out-of-pocket spending shock is borne 
entirely by each individual. 
Since there is unavoidable measurement error in this approach to estimating c, 
and because welfare estimates are naturally sensitive to c at low values, I follow the 
standard procedure for ruling out implausibly low values of c (e.g. Brown and 
Finkelstein, 2008; Hoynes and Luttmer, 2011) by imposing an annual consumption 
floor. The baseline analysis imposes a consumption floor of 2,400 RMB per year, 
which corresponds to the 5th percentile of non-medical consumption for the whole 
sample. The value of the consumption floor is selected according to the 2010 China 
Statistical Year Book, where the total living expenditure for the low-income 
households is 2535.35 RMB. In the sensitivity analysis below, I explore sensitivity to 
the assumed value of the consumption floor. 
2.4 Welfare Results 
2.4.1 Empirical estimation results 
This section examines the impacts of the NCMS on the following outcomes in 
sequence: health, household consumption, and health expenditure using the empirical 
strategy specified in Section 4. Table 2.5 reports the first stage estimation, regressing 
the household NCMS enrolment status against the proportion of households enrolled 
in the community excluding the observed household. The result indicates that the 
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household’s decision in participating in the NCMS is highly correlated with the 
proportion of enrolled households in the community, suggesting strong peer effects. 
Table 2.3 Column 1 presents the coefficient estimate on the health measurement, 
the fraction of the past 28 days in which members of the household suffered from severe 
illness limiting daily activities. Enrollment in the NCMS increases the number of days 
household members unable to perform daily activities: on average, participating in the 
NCMS leads to an increase of 7.03 days, though statistically not significant.  
I construct alternative health measurements to identify the effect of the NCMS 










𝑚 1(18 ≤ 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚 ≤ 65)
𝑀
𝑚=1  is the total number of days in the past four-
weeks household members age between 18 and 65 years old unable to perform daily 
activities. Table 2.3 Column 2 reports the estimation result. On average, participating 
in the NCMS leads to an increase of 2.04 days on number of days working-age 
household members unable to perform daily activities. Though statistically not 
significant, the estimated results show that the NCMS influences household labor 
supply decisions mainly through the non-working-age members. 
Table 2.3 Column 3 and 4 present the coefficient estimates on household 
monthly non-medical consumption. On average, enrollment in the NCMS increases the 
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household monthly consumption by 7.45 RMB or equivalently 2% of the total 
household non-medical consumption. 
Table 2.4 presents the mean effect estimating the NCMS’s impacts on health 
expenditures. Column 1 and 2 report the impacts of the NCMS on monthly medical 
expenditure. Participating in the NCMS increases the monthly medical expenditure of 
the enrolled households: on average, joining the NCMS leads to 19.04 RMB increase 
of medical spending, or 2% more compared to the households without the NCMS. 
Column 3 and 4 report the impacts of the NCMS on monthly out-of-pocket spending. 
Enrollment in the NCMS leads to an average 1.516 RMB increase or equivalently 0.03% 
more in monthly out-pf-pocket expenditure compared to the households without. None 
of the regression results are statistically significant. 
The estimated effects of the NCMS on health, consumption and health 
expenditures are consistent with the findings of the previous studies. Joining the NCMS 
has modest impact on improving health status, reducing the total medical service usage 
and out-of-pocket spending (Lei and Lin, 2009; Wagstaff et al., 2009; Hou et al, 2014; 
Liu, 2016). Bai et al. (2013) also find that enrolment in the program increases non-
medical consumption by approximately 5%, similar in scale with findings in this paper. 
2.4.2 Welfare estimation results 
Panel A of Table 2.5 reports the welfare results from the baseline analysis. 
Complete-information approach 
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I estimate equation (5) for 𝛾(𝑞). This requires me to estimate the mean health 
outcomes and the distribution of consumption for control compliers and treatment 
compliers. Table 2.3 column (1) shows the estimate of the average health differences 
of control compliers and treatment compliers. To estimate the distribution of 
consumption for the treatment and control compliers, I follow a parametric IV 
technique specified in Imbens and Rubin (1997). Details of implementation are 
described in Appendix A.1. The complete-information approach requires that an 
estimation of values in changed health, 𝜙. As discussed above, the baseline analysis 
assumes 𝜙 = 73 RMB, the value of a labor day. I also assume in the baseline analysis 
that 𝜎 = 1.5. 
The first column of Table 2.5 shows the resultant estimate: 𝛾(𝑞) = 109.7 RMB. 
In other words, the estimated result shows that an NCMS recipient would be indifferent 
between giving up the NCMS and giving up 109.7 RMB in monthly consumption. If 
we assume the same effects across the months, the annual welfare benefits of the 
NCMS per household is 1316.4 RMB. I decompose the welfare value of the NCMS to 
the recipients 𝛾(𝑞)  into transfer term of 71.4 RMB (see equation 6) and “pure-
insurance” term of 38.3 RMB (see equation 7). The result suggests that approximately 
65% of the value of the NCMS comes from the transfer component, and about 35% 
comes from the NCMS’s ability to move resources across different states of the world. 
Since the complete-information approach involves summing up over all the 
impacts of the NCMS on each argument of the utility function, it is natural to 
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decompose the welfare value into components operating through health and component 
operating through consumption. I define the welfare value of the NCMS to recipients 









and estimate 𝛾𝐶 = 68.7 RMB. Therefore, the value of the NCMS operates through 
health is 𝛾𝑀 = 41  RMB. Appendix A.2 provides implementation details. The 
estimation result suggests that recipients’ value the NCMS both through its impact on 
consumption as well as on health.  
Optimization approach 
I estimate the transfer component and pure-insurance component separately, 
and then combine them for the overall welfare estimation under the optimization 
approach. The estimation of the transfer component is relatively straightforward. The 
estimation of the pure-insurance component requires an assumption about the 
coefficient of risk aversion. I use the same assumption as in the complete-information 
approach: 𝜎 = 1.5.  
Without any assumption on utility function, the optimization approach 
estimates the value of the transfer component using only the estimates of the medical 
costs, m, and price, p. Using linear approximation, the transfer term is 50.6 RMB. The 
estimation of the pure-insurance term requires an estimate of the covariance between 
consumption distribution and medical spending, which can be obtained directly from 
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data. Following the linear approximation assumption, the total pure-insurance 
component is 55.7 RMB. 
The overall welfare benefits of the NCMS measured using the optimization 
approach is 106.3 RMB per recipient per month. The proportion of welfare benefits 
come from transfer component is slightly smaller compared to the results under the 
complete-information approach. Transfer component represents 48% of the total 
welfare value while pure-insurance term approximately 52%. The welfare value 
measured by the optimization approach is slightly lower than under the complete-
information approach. I interpret the values from the two approaches as the upper and 
lower bounds of the potential range of the two welfare components. 
2.4.3 Interpretation 
I benchmark the welfare estimates against the costs of the NCMS. Government 
costs, G, are the difference between total medical spending and out-of-pocket spending 
for treatment compliers. The estimated government cost for the NCMS is 
approximately 77.5 RMB per recipient per month. The net cost of the NCMS, C, is 
76.4 RMB per recipient per month. The estimates of the costs are in general consistent 
with external estimates of annual per-household spending in the NCMS program. 
Define the monetary transfer from the NCMS to external party as the difference 
between the gross costs and net costs: N = G – C. The estimates of the gross costs and 
net costs of the NCMS leave a small margin for transfer to external parties: only 1.1 
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RMB per recipient per month. Since N measures the difference between the total 
medical bills and the amount the uninsured paid, it gives a value of implicit insurance 
for the uninsured. The result is not surprising under the context of rural China since the 
uninsured typically all their medical expenses out-of-pocket with little covered by 
hospital or any other third parties. Uninsured individuals may receive supports from 
family members or relatives but since the measurement unit is household in the analysis, 
the magnitude of those transfers is small. 
To better understand the meanings of these estimates, I conduct several 
comparisons between the costs and the welfare evaluation. The results are summarized 
in Panel B of Table 2.6. Comparing the value of the welfare benefits and the 
government’s gross costs of providing the insurance provides insights into the existing 
rural insurance market in China. If rural residents have access to a well-functioning 
private insurance market or other actuarially-fair risk protection products, the welfare 
value of the NCMS, 𝛾(𝑞), may be less than the government's costs of provision, G. 
However, if self-insurance is the major mean of risk hedging among rural residents in 
China, the welfare benefits may be well-above the government's costs. 
For both methods, I consistently estimate that the welfare benefit of the NCMS, 
𝛾(𝑞),  is more than G. A benefit-cost ratio of 1.4 indicates that individual would prefer 
to obtain the NCMS at the cost of G in consumption than the status quo. Comparing 
the welfare value and the government's net costs of providing the insurance paints a 
similar picture. Excluding the potential transfer to external parties from the NCMS (N), 
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the net costs reflect the "true cost" of the NCMS to the public sector. Depending on the 
approach, the ratio between the welfare value and the net costs varies from 1.39 to 1.44. 
Across the baseline estimation, I consistently estimate that 𝛾(𝑞) is more than G. 
Depending on the approach used, I estimate a ratio of welfare benefits and government 
gross costs is approximately 1.4. This implies that the recipients value the NCMS 
approximately equal or higher than the government’s costs of providing the insurance. 
That is to say, an uninsured household would prefer to obtain the NCMS at the cost of 
G in consumption than the status quo. However, 𝛾(𝑞) > G does not answer the question 
of whether an uninsured household would prefer receiving the NCMS than to receiving 
G in additional consumption or, equivalently, whether an insured household would be 
willing to give up the NCMS in exchange for a consumption increase of G. 
Comparing the value of the welfare benefits and the government’s net costs of 
providing the insurance provides consistent interpretation. Excluding the potential 
transfer to external parties from the NCMS (N), the net costs reflect the “true cost” of 
the NCMS to the public sector. Depending on the approach, the ratio between the 
welfare value and the net costs varies from 1.39 RMB to 1.44 RMB. The fact that 𝛾(𝑞) 
is consistently above C implies that the insurance value of the NCMS to the recipients, 
I, exceeds the associated moral hazard costs. The results imply that formal medical care 
are “luxury” goods to rural households in China. Even with access to health insurance, 
rural households would prefer to seek formal medical services only when necessary.  
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The findings suggest that the NCMS is highly valuable to the rural households 
in China and government could increase the generosity of the insurance for higher 
welfare benefits. The high value of the welfare estimation of the NCMS is also because 
the uninsured in rural China pay all their medical spending with few incidences of 
receiving unpaid care. Therefore, the monetary transfer from the NCMS to external 
party is almost non-existent, leaving majority of the cost of the NCMS as net costs. 
2.4.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
Risk aversion and consumption floor 
Table 2.7 column II to V explore alternative choices for risk aversion 
(coefficient of relative risk aversion of 1.2 and 3, compared to our baseline of 1.5) and 
the consumption floor (of 100 RMB or 500 RMB per month, compared to the baseline 
assumption of 200 RMB). Since the coefficient of relative risk aversion models 
individuals’ attitude towards risk, the higher the 𝜎 , the more risk averse of the 
individuals and thus have a higher preference for consumption smoothing. The 
estimated results confirmed the hypothesis. Compare to the baseline results, the welfare 
benefits of the recipient exceed the government costs under higher risk aversion value 
(𝜎 = 3) for both approaches. That is, if the households at rural China were more risk 
aversion compared to the baseline, they would value the NCMS much higher than the 
government’s costs of providing it. Lowering the risk aversion value (𝜎 = 1.2) results 
in a lower evaluation of the welfare value of the NCMS, which is as expected. Table 
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2.7 column IV and V report the results using different consumption floor. A higher 
consumption floor leads to lower welfare benefits, suggesting that if households have 
access to other consumption smoothing channels (i.e. higher household income), they 
would value the NCMS lower. 
Alternative assumption about within-family smoothing. 
The baseline consumption proxy assumed that out-of-pocket medical spending 
reduced consumption of each family member by the same amount. Health is measured 
at the unit of a household, assuming that the influence of the health shock will impact 
all household members equally. Under the context of rural China, within-family risk 
smoothing is common, given majority of the consumption is joint (e.g. food, housing) 
and many of the works are done as a family unit (e.g. farming). However, the extreme 
of the full smoothing within the family (i.e. the effect on an individual’s consumption 
is the same regardless of whether the individual incurred the out-of-pocket spending) 
may not be guaranteed. In Table 2.8 Column II, I examine the sensitivity of the results 
to individual health measurement. Using individual health measurement, the welfare 
value is slightly lower than the baseline evaluation for the complete-information 
approach. The change has not impact on the results of the optimization approach. In 
Table 2.8 Column III, I examine the sensitivity of the results to an alternative 
assumption: that the out-of-pocket spending affects consumption only for the 
individual who incurred expenses. This slightly raises the estimates of the value of the 
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NCMS relative to the gross costs under complete-information approach. The results 
using the optimization approach have little changes. 
2.5 Conclusion 
This paper studies the welfare benefits of offering universal health insurance to 
low-income households. One of the major concerns for providing public health 
insurance is the associated moral hazard costs. Individuals consume more medical care 
because of lower out-of-pocket price. Traditionally, the moral hazard effect has been 
interpreted as welfare-decreasing. In recent studies, access to health insurance is shown 
to also contain a welfare-enhancing income effect, allowing individuals to seek medical 
treatments that are previously unaffordable. Whether this tradeoff results in positive 
welfare gain remains unclear especially among low-income households. 
I empirically examine this issue through exploiting a health insurance reform, 
the New Cooperative Medical Scheme in rural China. The welfare value of the NCMS 
is evaluated from its function as resource transfer and from its role of consumption 
smoothing. I find robust evidence that the welfare gains individuals enjoy from the 
NCMS program are above its costs. A benefit-cost ratio of 1.4 confirms that enrolled 
individuals would much likely to take up the insurance given the government’s costs. 
A positive welfare gain suggests that income effect plays a major role in individual's 
increased medical care consumption. Moral hazard costs, though exist, are smaller than 
the welfare benefits generated. Contrary to findings in the U.S., less than 1% of the 
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gross costs is due to transfers to third party, suggesting that the NCMS enrollees are 
the main beneficiary of the program. 
The welfare benefits come from both NCMS's ability in transferring resources 
to the recipients as well as its insurance function. One-third to half of the welfare 
benefits are from the NCMS's insurance function. The estimation results suggest that 
benefits of the public insurance program could come from offering efficient 
consumption smoothing mechanisms among low- and middle-income households. The 
existing literature have shown the public insurance programs in developing countries 
could lead to net welfare gains by reducing the use of costly self-insurance mechanisms. 
The findings in this paper support the same argument. 
While the study focuses on China, the results have broader implications for 
many developing countries whose population have little access to formal insurances. 
The average annual consumption among rural households in 2010 is 4,381 RMB, 
similar to the consumption level at several low-, middle income countries. The 
insurance enrollment rate and average medical spending per person among rural China 







Table 2.1 Implementation of the Reform 
 Household County 
Year % access to NCMS % Insured % Treated 
1993 0 4.53 0 
1997 0 14.3 0 
2000 0 8.07 0 
2004 29.89 15.2 8.3 
2006 68.16 52.2 61.1 
2009 100 96.4 100 
2011 100 98.1 100 
Note: Each round of the survey contains households sampled from 36 
counties (four counties per province). Four counties from Liaoning 
















Panel A. Household Demographics 
Age of the head 46.900 45.445 48.951 
 (10.260) (10.386) (9.718) 
Head being single 0.091 0.094 0.086 
 (0.288) (0.292) (0.281) 
Head with at least 9 years of 
education 
0.441 0.388 0.516 
 (0.497) (0.487) (0.500) 
Household size 3.089 3.465 2.558 
 (1.471) (1.507) (1.238) 
Share of children (aged 7 – 18)  0.183 0.223 0.125 
in the household (0.209) (0.215) (0.186) 
Total annual household income 20,139 14,377 28,425 
 (19,423) (13,659) (23,132) 
Panel B. Outcome Variables     
Share of days with severe illness 
(all working members) 
2.378 2.084 2.793 
 (12.160) (11.289) (13.282) 
Share of days with severe 
illness(all family members) 
2.817 2.575 3.158 
 (13.334) (12.796) (14.053) 
Monthly out-of-pocket spending 160.9 111.4 230.7 
 (1510) (912) (2077) 
Monthly medical spending 194.0 112.9 308 
 (1869) (913.8) (2689) 
Monthly household consumption 1673 1233 2,307 





Table 2.3 Effect of the NCMS on Health and Consumption 
 
Health 









 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
NCMS 0.251 0.0727 7.447 0.0224 
 (0.707) (0.752) (108.7) (0.0649) 
Number of 
observations 
12555 12555 12243 12243 
Adjusted R-
square 
0.022 0.024 0.225 0.269 
Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the county level. Health is 
the share of days in the past 28 days (in percentage points) in which all the working 
family members or all family members suffered from severe illness limiting daily 
activities. Each regression controls household size, percentage of children, 
household head’s age and age square, household head’s education, whether 
household head is single, wave and county fixed effects. 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
  
 










 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
NCMS 19.04 0.0158 1.516 0.0003 




12555 12555 12555 12555 
Adjusted R-
square 
0.006 0.093 0.005 0.092 
Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the county level. Each 
regression controls household size, percentage of children, household head’s age 
and age square, household head’s education, whether household head is single, 
wave and county fixed effects. 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table 2.5 First Stage Result for the Instrument Variable 
 Household NCMS status 
  
Proportion of households enrolled in NCMS 




Number of observations 12,555 
R-square 0.916 
Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the county level. Regression 
controls household size, percentage of children, household’s age and age square, 
household education, whether household is single, wave and county fixed effects.  
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 




Welfare benefits   





Transfer-term 71.4 50.6 
Pure-insurance Term 38.3 55.7 
Benchmarks   
Welfare effects relative to: 
gross costs, 𝜸(𝒒)/𝑮 1.42 1.37 
net costs, 𝜸(𝒒)/𝑪 1.44 1.39 
moral hazard cost, G-T-N 5 25.8 
Notes: Estimates of welfare effects and moral hazard costs are expressed in RMB per 




Table 2.7 Sensitivity of Welfare Estimates on Degree of Risk Aversion and 
Consumption Floor 












Panel A : Welfare 
Relative to Gross 
Costs , 𝜸(𝒒)/𝑮 
     
Complete-
information 
1.42 1.40 2.57 1.55 1.20 
Optimization 1.37 0.93 1.41 1.37 0.72 
Panel B: Welfare 
Relative to Net 
Costs,  𝜸(𝒒)/𝑪 
     
Complete-
information 
1.44 1.42 2.61 1.57 1.22 










Table 2.8 Sensitivity of Welfare Estimates on Health Measurement 
  I II III 
  Baseline 
Individual Health 
Measure 









      
Complete-
information 
1.42 1.174 1.55 




Relative to Net 
Costs, 
 𝜸(𝒒)/𝑪 
   
Complete-
information 
1.44 1.220 1.57 






















Figure 2: Percentage of Rural Sample Covered by Any Type of Health Insurance 
 
 























Appendix A.1 Estimating Outcome Distributions for NCMS Compliers  
Let 𝑓𝑔(𝑥) denote the observed probability density function (pdf) x for group 
𝑔 ∈ {𝑇𝐶, 𝐶𝐶, 𝐴𝑇, 𝑁𝑇}  where TC are the treatment compliers, CC are the control 
compliers, AT are the always-takers, and NT are the never-takers. In the sample, 
always-takers are defined as households who were enrolled in health insurance before 
the introduction of the NCMS to their residing county and never-takers are households 
who were not enrolled in the NCMS after the reform. I observe 𝑓𝑁𝑇(𝑥), the distribution 
of x for never takers, as well as 𝑓𝐴𝑇(𝑥) directly. The population fraction of never-takers, 
𝜑𝑁𝑇, is given by the fraction of the treatment group that did not take up the program. 
Similarly, the population fraction of always-takers, 𝜑𝐴𝑇 is given by the fraction of the 
control group that took up the program. 
The population fraction of compliers is given by: 𝜑𝐶 = 1 − 𝜑𝐴𝑇 − 𝜑𝑁𝑇. The 
distribution of x for compliers cannot be observed directly from the data. In the control 
group, those who were not enrolled in any health insurance are a mixture of never-
takers and compliers. Similarly, in the treatment group, those who choose to enroll in 
the NCMS are a mixture of always-takers and compliers. Following Imbens and Rubin 












𝑓𝑇𝐶(𝑥), where 𝑔𝐶𝐶(𝑥) and 𝑔𝑇𝐶(𝑥) are 
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the potential outcome distribution of consumption for control compliers and treatment 
compliers respectively. 
Assume the household consumption follows a log-normal distribution (Battistin, 
Blundell and Lewbel, 2009), I allow the parameters of the distribution to differ across 
the four groups: 𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑁(𝑥|𝜇 𝑔, 𝜐𝑔) for 𝑔 ∈ {𝑇𝐶, 𝐶𝐶, 𝐴𝑇, 𝑁𝑇}, where 𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑁(𝑥|𝜇, 𝜈) is 
the CDF of a log-normal with mean and variance parameters 𝜇 and 𝜈. I estimate the 
eight parameters using maximum likelihood estimation. Calculation of the maximum 
likelihood estimates is based on the EM algorithm (Dempster, Laird and Rubin (1977)).  
To assess the goodness of fit, Figure 2.A1 plots the estimated and actual CDF 
separately based on NCMS county level offer status. As can be seen from these figures, 
the parametric model fits quite well.   







Appendix A.2 Decomposition of welfare effects in the complete-information 
approach  
To explore the underlying factors that drive the value of the welfare estimates, 
I decompose 𝛾(𝑞) into two components: 𝛾𝑐, welfare comes from consumption, and 𝛾𝑚, 
welfare comes from health. 𝛾𝑐 is estimated based on the following equation given the 









Naturally, 𝛾𝑚 is calculated as the difference between 𝛾(𝑞) and 𝛾𝑐. I further decompose 
the welfare effects operate from consumption and health into a transfer term and a pure-
insurance term, similar as the optimization approach. The transfer component of 𝛾𝑐 is 
defined as  
𝛾𝑐,𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟 = 𝐸[𝑐(𝑞; 𝜋) − 𝑐(0; 𝜋)]. 
The pure-insurance component of  𝛾𝑐 is then: 𝛾𝑐,𝑖𝑛𝑠 = 𝛾𝑐 −  𝛾𝑐,𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟. 
Recall from section 3, health is produced according to a health production 
function ℎ =  ℎ̃(𝑚; 𝜃)  . Substituting this into equation (4), we define the transfer 









?̃?ℎ̃(𝐸[𝑚(𝑞; 𝜃)]; 𝜃)]. 
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𝛾𝑚,𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟  is interpreted as welfare associated with the change in health condition 
from the average change in medical spending due to the NCMS. The change in health 
condition is approximated as following: 
E[?̃?ℎ̃(𝐸[𝑚(0; 𝜃)]; 𝜃) − ?̃?ℎ̃(𝐸[𝑚(𝑞; 𝜃)]; 𝜃)] = ?̃?𝐸 [
𝑑ℎ̃
𝑑𝑚
] 𝐸[𝑚(𝑞; 𝜃) − 𝑚(0; 𝜃)]. 
The pure-insurance component of is 𝛾𝑚,𝑖𝑛𝑠 =  𝛾𝑚 − 𝛾𝑚,𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟. 




] between 𝑚(𝑞; 𝜃) and 𝑚(0; 𝜃). In the analysis, I use a simple OLS 
regression of the household medical spending on health measures, controlling log 
household size, share of children in the household, share of working-age adults in the 
household, age and age-squared of the household head, indicators for the education 
level of the household head, whether the household head is single, wave and county 
fixed effects. The slope of the health production function is estimated as the average 
effect of medical spending on changes in health measures. The regression result is 





Table 2.A.1 Effect of Medical Spending on Health Measure 
 Household Health Measure 
  




Number of observations 12555 
R-square 0.028 
Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the county level. Regression 
controls household size, percentage of children, household’s age and age square, 
household education, whether household is single, wave and county fixed effects.  















Appendix A.3 First-Stage Regression Results using Different Instrument 
Variables 
To compare the effects of different instrumental variables, I run the first-stage 
of 2SLS regression using county offer status and the duration of community-level 
NCMS availability. Table A.2 reports the results, regressing the household NCMS 
enrollment status against the county offer status and the duration of community-level 
NCMS availability. The result indicates that county offer status is highly correlated 
with the household’s decision in participating in the NCMS while the duration is 
community-level NCMS availability is only weakly relevant. However, the R-square 
using proportion of households enrolled in the community excluding the observed 
household is higher than the county offer status, suggesting a stronger relationship. 






   
County-offer Status 0.622***  
 (0.071)  
Duration of community-
level NCMS availability 
 
0.004 
  (0.012) 
 
  
Number of observations 12,555 12,555 
R-square 0.837 0.756 
Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the county level. Regression 
controls household size, percentage of children, household’s age and age square, 
household education, whether household is single, wave and county fixed effects.  











The emergence of the Great Recession puts Unemployment Insurance (UI) back 
at the centre of political debate. Multiple extensions of UI benefits have been 
implemented over the last decade and the federal annual spending increased from $33 
billion in 2007 to $155 billion 2010 (Congregational Budget Office, 2010). The length 
of UI benefits was extended, at the peak, to 99 weeks, causing a heated debate whether 
UI itself was to blame for the long unemployment duration. A natural proceeding 
question is therefore whether an alternative UI design could balance the dynamics 
between disincentive costs and insurance benefits. 
To answer the question, I adopt the concept of Unemployment Insurance 
Savings Account (UISA), proposed by Feldstein and Altman (1998) and Hopenhayn 
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and Hatchondo (2002), but combine it with the current UI to form a two-tiered 
unemployment insurance system. The system works as follows: each individual is 
required to save a fraction of his pre-tax wage income in a special individual 
Unemployment Insurance Savings Account during employment. When unemployed, 
instead of joining UI, he withdraws an amount equal to the current UI benefits from his 
personal UISA until he depletes the account. If by then, the individual is still 
unemployed, he would be eligible for the UI benefits for maximum 26 weeks. The 
UISA earns a market rate of return on existing balances and is merged into the 
individual’s pension account upon retirement.  
The advantage of adding UISA in the unemployment insurance system is that 
by internalising the cost of unemployment, incentives are improved. The second layer 
of usual UI provides the necessary safety net and guarantees protection for individual 
unemployment risks. As a form of self-insurance, UISA has the advantage of inducing 
little moral hazard effects. But it has been criticised for potential impacts in crowding 
out precautionary savings as well as lack of redistribution Therefore, the key issues in 
considering the two-tiered unemployment insurance system are whether it could reduce 
unemployment duration, whether it is welfare improving compared to the current 
program, and how valuable is the system compared to its efficiency costs. 
To evaluate the two-tiered unemployment insurance system and its alternative 
designs, I propose a life-cycle model that allows me to study individual savings, labour 
supply and job search intensities under non-separable preferences. Moral hazard arises 
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as workers can decide to quit their jobs during employment, not accept a job offer or 
not active in job search during unemployment. In addition, I assume workers can save 
at the market rate but cannot borrow. The savings in the model capture the 
precautionary motives. 
Estimates of the model parameters are obtained using microeconomic data from 
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79). Key parameters of the 
model are structurally estimated through Indirect Inference Method, minimising the 
distance between the life-cycle data profiles from NLSY79 and the simulated life-cycle 
profiles generated by the model. Finally, with the estimated parameters, I conduct 
counterfactual policy simulations to analyse the effects of proposed two-tiered 
unemployment insurance system through varying policy parameters: (i) rates of 
contribution to the UISA. and (ii) the replacement rate of the UI benefits. The ability 
to evaluate these questions in a coherent, unified framework is one of the main benefits 
of the paper. The metric for individual welfare is the consumption equivalent that keeps 
expected utility at the start of life constant as policy changes.  
The literature on the UI program, surveyed in the next Section, contains both 
reduced form papers attempting to estimate the extent of adverse incentives created by 
the program and its insurance value, as well as sophisticated structural analyses 
designed towards assessing the consequences of reforming the program. As with most 
structural models, the value of the paper relative to reduced form analyses is that I can 
conduct counterfactual analysis of potential reforms, that have not been experienced in 
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the past or that are too costly to assess in a randomized evaluation context, to the current 
UI program. Relative to existing structural analyses, I stress the importance of many 
model features: non-separable preferences, job search efforts, permanent skill shocks, 
and interactions with social welfare programs. Further, I study the effects of novel 
unemployment insurance policy reforms, and subject the model to various validity tests.  
I find that financing unemployment through individual mandatory saving 
significantly reduce the unemployment duration especially for young workers. 
Compared to the existing unemployment insurance program, workers under the UISA 
are more likely to exit from unemployment and take up job offers. Consistent with the 
findings from the previous studies, the UISA foster long-term saving and facilitate 
consumption smoothing over the life-cycle. Workers under the UISA consume less 
when young but more when old. Overall, including the UISA on top of the existing 
unemployment insurance leads to a welfare gain of 1%. 
In addition to reduce unemployment duration, I find that moral hazard effects 
exist in the two-tiered unemployment insurance program. A more generous program 
not only leads to longer unemployment duration but also lowered incomes over the life-
cycle due to loss of working years. Under the two-tiered unemployment program, 
workers consume more under a less generous program and accumulate higher amount 
in individual mandatory saving account. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the related 
literature. Section 3.3 presents the life-cycle model of labour supply, consumption, and 
91 
job search. Section 3.4 discusses the data used for analysis. Section 3.5 presents the 
identification strategy and results. Section 3.6 conducts the counterfactual analysis and 
evaluates the welfare consequences of the two-tiered unemployment insurance system. 
Section 3.7 presents the robustness analysis results with varying relative risk aversion. 
Section 3.8 concludes.  
3.2 Literature Review 
A large literature studying the effects of UI on unemployment have focused on 
labour supply behaviours during unemployment and reached a general consensus that 
more generous UI program leads to longer unemployment duration, suggesting the 
disincentive effects of UI. The rise of replacement rate and extension of benefit 
duration, impact the labour supply behaviours adversely by decreasing search intensity 
and increasing reservation wage. Through studying various extensions of UI benefits 
during recession periods, Card and Levine (2000), Farber and Volletta (2015) and 
Farber, Rothstein, and Valletta (2015) found small but significant negative effects of 
UI on the exit rates of unemployment and expected unemployment duration. Taking 
advantage of a change in maximum UI benefit in New York State, Meyers and Mok 
(2014) confirm the conclusion from previous studies that higher UI payments lead to 
longer unemployment duration (Meyer, 1990; Katz and Meyer, 1990). Card et al. (2015) 
extends the literature by examining the elasticity of UI duration with respect to weekly 
benefit and concludes that UI durations are more responsive during recessions than pre-
92 
recession, in a range of 0.6 to 0.9. I compare the implied elasticity of employment with 
respect to UI benefit from my model with the estimates in the literature. 
Despite a long literature of the disincentive effect, the provision of UI brings 
support to individuals during unemployment who would otherwise suffer from 
reductions in consumption (Gruber, 1997; Browning and Crossley, 2001). A recent 
stream of research suggests that labour supply responses to variations of UI benefits 
can be decomposed of liquidity effects and “moral hazard” effects (Shimer and 
Werning, 2008; Chetty, 2008). Chetty (2008) points out that the effect of UI on 
unemployment duration is mainly due to liquidity effect for constrained individuals and 
substitution effects for the unconstrained. Based on this conclusion, the increase of 
unemployment duration due to UI would be socially beneficial as it allows the liquidity 
constrained individuals to search longer, who would otherwise have to take jobs earlier 
than desired. Rothstein (2011) also argues that UI could increase the measured 
unemployment by inducing individuals, who would otherwise drop out of labour force, 
to search longer. Utilising kinks in the scheduled UI benefits, Landais (2015) confirms 
the existence of significant liquidity effects and show that a small increase of UI 
duration could be welfare improving.  
However, extended search duration due to UI does not necessarily lead to better 
jobs. Using a series of age discontinuities in benefit duration in Germany, Schmieder, 
von Wachter, and Bender (2012, 2013) show that a prolonged unemployment spell 
induced by extended UI benefits leads to a decline in weekly earnings: approximately 
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0.6 to 0.8 percent for each additional month out of work. Card, Chetty and Weber (2007) 
found similar result that the increases in the search duration induced by UI have little 
effect on subsequent job match quality, using various discontinuities for extended UI 
and severance pay eligibility in Austria.  
The balance between providing liquidity supports and mitigating the 
disincentive effects leads to a stream of research discussing the optimal designs of UI. 
There has been an influential theoretical literature on optimal UI designs but in stylised 
models, thus difficult to connect to the data (Hopenhayn and Nicolini, 1997; Shimer 
and Werning, 2008; Lentz, 2009). Specially, unemployment policies appear to vary 
substantially across countries. In the US, benefits are usually paid only during the first 
six months of unemployment with little supports afterwards (i.e. Food Stamps). In 
countries such as Belgium and Sweden, the unemployed could receive same benefit 
amount forever, while in Germany, the unemployed continue to receive a less generous 
support, unemployment assistance (UA), upon the exhaustion of UI. The diversified 
unemployment policies increase the difficulty in interpreting the results of empirical 
studies regarding optimal UI designs. For example, using data from Germany, Hann 
and Prowse (2015) suggests an optimal policy design focuses mainly on Social 
Assistance, a government program that provides a universal household income floor, 
with a minor role of UI. Such a design would be difficult to apply from the US 
perspective.  
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Under the context of the US, recent papers have proposed two alternative 
designs for the current UI program. Koehne and Kuhn (2015) suggest an asset-tested 
UI policy and show the welfare improvement is minimal given the distorting saving 
incentives. Proposing an age-dependent scheme, Michelacci and Ruffo (2015) show 
that redistributing unemployment insurance over the life cycle, increasing for the young 
and decreasing for the old, are welfare-improving. Both designs are based on the 
insights that moral hazard can be reduced by financing consumption during 
unemployment through individual assets and are less prone to individuals with liquidity 
constraints. However, the asset-tested UI design could lead to disincentive in asset 
accumulating, larger drop in consumption at the start of unemployment and reduce the 
internalisation of the unemployment costs (Koehne and Kuhn, 2015).  
The concept of Unemployment Insurance Savings Account (UISA) is first 
proposed by Feldstein and Altman (1998) as an alternative to the traditional 
unemployment system. Orszwag and Snower (2002) and Stiglitz and Yun (2005) both 
show that allowing liquidity during unemployment, either by mandatory saving or by 
borrowing against future pension fund, could be welfare-enhancing compared to the 
current system. Following the practice of Feldstein and Altman (2007), Rodrigues 
(2008) and Vodopivec (2008) simulate the introduction of UISA in Portugal and 
Slovenia and show the feasibility of the design with little distortion in distributional 
effects. Empirical evidence of UISA is scarce because few governments had 
implemented such a policy. Several recent papers evaluate the reduced-form effects of 
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UISA reforms in Latin-American countries (Ferrer and Riddell, 2009; Hartley et al. 
2010) but fail to deliver consistent conclusions. 
The paper closest to mine is Setty (2017). Setty (2017) proposes a policy design 
with the combination of UI and UISA, and shows that the new system requires lower 
unemployment replacement but delivers higher welfare benefits. The innovative part 
of his framework is that he proposes a two-tiered hybrid system, which is similar to my 
design of the unemployment insurance system. However, he models the second-tier of 
benefits indefinitely, rather than 26 weeks as the current system. The unemployment 
insurance program in Setty (2017) does not interact with other government transfer 
programs and the UI benefit replacement schedule is a constant proportion of pre-
unemployment wages, which ignores actual minimum and maximum UI benefit levels. 
As a result of these shortcomings, the effect of an unemployment insurance system 
combining UISA and UI on unemployment duration is likely to be overstated. It 
remains an open question whether, in the context of a more realistic mode, a two-tiered 
unemployment insurance is welfare improving. 
3.3 Life-Cycle Model 
3.3.1 Overview 
I specify a model where individuals make consumption, labour supply, and 
search effort decisions to maximise lifetime expected utility: 
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where  is the time discount factor,  the conditional expectation based on 
information available in period t, p a discrete indicator of employment status, and c 
consumption. Time is measured in months. Individuals live for T periods, may work 
from age 23 to 62, and face an exogenous mandatory spell of retirement of  
years until the end of life. The date of death is known with certainty. There is no 
bequeath motive and health status. 
For those in the labor force, each period proceeds as follows. i) Unemployed 
individual chooses the amount of search efforts. ii) Individual decides on whether to 
accept the job offer, which arrives as a result of the individual search productivity and 
search intensity, or wait longer. iii) Employed individual observes the market wage and 
unemployed individual observes the unemployment insurance status. iv) Individual 
makes consumption and saving decisions. v) The employment status is updated as a 
result of job destruction, quit or accepted job offer. The model imposes sufficient risks 
regarding individual unemployment, productivity and unsuccessful job searches. Once 
an individual enters retirement compulsory at 63, there are no further opportunities for 
job search or labor supply decisions. Individuals collect social security benefits, which 
are paid according to a formula observed in reality. Social security benefits, together 
with assets individuals voluntarily accumulated over the working years, are used to 
finance consumption during retirement.  
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3.3.2 Preference 
The per-period utility function of a worker at age t is given by  
 
where  is monthly individual consumption, and  employment status at age t, and 
 search decision at age t;  is the worker’s coefficient or risk aversion. Employment 
brings a utility loss determined by the value of  . The specification of the utility 
function implies that consumption and work are Frisch complements and thus the 
marginal utility of consumption is higher when working. I adopt this specification 
based on findings that consumption and leisure are not additively separable within a 
period (Heckman, 1974; Blundell, Browning, and Meghir, 1994; Attanasio and Weber, 
1995; Low, 2005). Search intensity increases the probability of job offers during 
unemployment but leads to decrease of utility enjoyed by the worker.  
3.3.3 Wage Process 
I assume that the logarithm of wages at age-t in the data are governed by the 
process: 
. 
 is the hourly wage rate,  the permanent component of wages,  the transitory 
error component. The permanent component of wages follows a random walk process: 
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. 
The random shock to the permanent process   is assumed to follow normal 
distribution with mean zero and variance  , and is independent over time. The 
transitory component  is assumed to be normally distributed with variance  and 
independent over time. This relatively simple wage process captures much of the 
observed wage profiles, especially after conditioning on education (Low, 2005). The 
wage is bounded below so that the individual will always receive a job offer with a 
non-zero wage. The wage process is not conditional on participation, thus the model 
abstracts from on-the-job human capital accumulation and the wage rate grows with 
age whether or not individuals participate. 
3.3.4 Labour Market Frictions 
Each period, an employed individual experience a job destruction with a 
probability . An employed individual who is not laid off decides whether to retain or 
quit the job. For unemployed individuals, at the beginning of the periods, he first 
chooses his search intensity  . The arrival of job offers depends on the individual 
search intensity. Following Hann and Prowse (2015), let  denote a worker’s search 
productivity. The probability of a worker with search intensity , receiving a job offer 
at period t is 
𝜆𝑡 = (1 − 𝜒𝑡)𝑠𝑡 
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where  . An individual who receives a 
job offer decides whether to accept that offer and become employed or to reject it and 
remain unemployed. 
The transitions between employment and unemployment allows for both 
exogenous and endogenous decisions. Employed individuals lose their jobs either 
because of an exogenous separation or an endogenous quit. Unemployed individuals 
remain unemployed because of either lack of job offers or rejection of one. The 
presence of endogenous decisions is an essential component of the model since it 
implies that unemployment is determined within the model and depends on the 
unemployment policy. 
3.3.5 Unemployment Insurance 
The Unemployment Insurance (UI) is a state-federal program that aims to 
provide workers with insurance against spells of involuntary job loss. It was set up 
based on the recognition that labour markets were imperfect, and the resulted 
involuntary unemployment could cause individuals experiencing severe hardships. The 
purpose of the UI benefit is to help individuals ease the burden of involuntary 
unemployment without unduly affecting the job search incentives. The general program 













requirements, benefit levels, and maximum duration20. The policy this paper focuses 
on is the program in place after the major amendments in 1976, though many minor 
revisions have been implemented since then. 
The receipt of the UI benefits requires the following condition: (1) An 
individual must file a claim; (2) A worker must have worked more than the essential 
minimum number of weeks and have earned higher than the earning requirement in the 
base period1; (3) The job separation must be involuntary. To continue receiving the UI 
benefits, a claimant must be available for work and active in job search throughout the 
unemployment spell. The weekly UI benefit amount is set to be at least one-half of the 
worker’s weekly wage loss, limited by the maximum weekly benefit amount. To insure 
adequate coverage, the maximum weekly benefit amount should be high enough to 
cover 80 percent of the insured workers, among whom, if unemployed, could receive 
at least half of the usually weekly wages. The eligible individuals would receive a 
proportion of the past average earnings for maximum 26 weeks.  
The actual award of UI benefits is a combination of coverage provisions, an 
individual’s decision to apply for benefits, and state eligibility standards. In my model, 
I make the following assumptions to capture the most salient features of the current 
                                                 
 
20 Details can be found in the Department of Labour publication Unemployment Insurance: 
State Laws and Experience 
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program. First, I assume that those who qualify for UI are automatically covered 
without filing a claim, and receive it for maximum 6 months. Second, an individual is 
initially eligible if he was working in the month prior to the unemployment, has earned 
a weekly average of at least 80 dollars, and was laid off from work (e.g. ). The 
UI benefits are computed as:  
, 
where is the replacement rate and  the average weekly earnings, calculated based 
on gross income during the 12 months prior to unemployment.  represents the 
maximum weekly benefit and m the minimum. Third, to continue the benefit receipt, 
an individual must be active in job search at every period during the benefit entitlement 
period. 
3.3.6 Government Transfer 
I assume that the government provides an income floor through a universal 
means- tested program. Following Low and Pistaferri (2015), the program has three 
characteristics: (i) it is mean-tested only on income rather than on income and assets; 
(ii) the program provides cash benefits; and (iii) the take-up is 100%. The gross income 
for the program is defined as  
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giving net income of , where d is the standard deduction for 
computing Food Stamp allowances. The value of the program is , 
where , the maximum payment, is set assuming a household with two adults and two 
children. Individuals are eligible if net income is below the poverty line ( ), denoted 
as . 
3.3.7 Social Security 
After retirement, individuals only incur a consumption-savings problem. 
Reflecting the current rule, the individual’s pension depends on this Average indexed 
Monthly Earnings (AIME), which is approximately his average income during this 35 
highest earning years. The value of Social Security is given by  
 
where  are thresholds taken from legislation. 
3.3.8 Intertemporal Budget Constraint 
The inter-temporal budget constraint during the working life has the form  
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where  represents the assets at the beginning of the period.  is the return to saving. 
 is the hourly wage rate and h is the fixed number of working hours (150 hours per 
month). During employment, a worker of age t pays income taxes that constitutes  
fraction of their labour income. Taxes are used to finance the UI and Social Security 
benefits. The details of tax are described in Appendix A. Individuals are assumed not 
allowed to borrow against future earnings:  . Once the individual is retired, his 
inter-temporal budget constraint follows: 
 
where represents the income from social security. 
3.3.9 Optimal Life-Cycle Behaviour 
Optimal decisions depend on the state variables, denoted as 
 , preferences denoted as  , and 
the parameters that determine the data generating process for the state variables denoted 
as . 
I denote the value function when employed as  and is written as: 
 
where   represents the value of being 
unemployed. Losing job, laid off or quit, would put the individual for at least one period 
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of unemployment. Combining the uncertainty of job search, individuals would have a 
strong preference to not quit the job. When unemployed, there are two states the 
individual can be: unemployed and not searching for jobs, , unemployed and 
searching for jobs  . The value function for unemployed and searching for jobs is 
given by  
 
The value function for unemployed and not searching for jobs is: 
. 
The optimal search intensity is the amount of effort that leaves the individual indifferent 
between searching and staying unemployed, and thus described as: 
. 
In the model, active search does not guarantee a successful job offer but cause disutility 
to the individuals. Therefore, individuals would have incentives not to search for jobs 
whenever the situation allows, reflecting the moral hazard behaviours in labour supply 
in the real data. 
Upon retirement, the individual’s choice problem ends since he could no longer 
search or work. The retirement problem entails only a consumption-savings decision. 
The value function for the retirement individual is 
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subjective to the budget constraint. 
3.3.10 Model Solution 
There is no analytical solution for the model. The model has to be solved 
numerically by backward recursion from period T, solving at each period for the value 
functions. To solve the model, I follow an approximation method developed by Keane 
and Wolpin (1994). 
3.4 Data 
I use the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79) for the model 
estimation. The NLSY79 is a longitudinal survey of 12,686 individuals from the cohort 
born between 1957 to 1964. They have been sampled annually from 1979 to 1994 and 
biennially from 1994 to 2012. The NLSY79 has several advantages over other 
longitudinal datasets for this study: (i) It contains extensive information on each 
individual’s labour market behaviour, educational outcomes, government program 
participation, assets and income. (ii) It provides a week-by-week record of individuals’ 
full work history including job-to-job transitions and the resulting wage each time, as 
well as the gaps in employment. (iii) The NLSY79 has very rich information regarding 
the reason of unemployment.  
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The sample selection is as follows. I focus on working-age male heads of 
household aged between 23 and 55 to estimate the model. Individuals who are missing 
more than three survey rounds are excluded. The final sample consist of 1,904,400 
month-individual observations, for 6,348 male respondents. 
The NLSY79 asked individuals to report every job the respondents held 
currently or since the last interview. At the first interview, respondents older than 18 
were required to identify each job held since age 18, and those who were younger than 
18 reported job history between age 15 to 17. Therefore, I could obtain a complete 
record of individuals’ work history without left-censoring. At each interview, 
respondents are required to report the start and end date of any job held since last 
interview. In addition, a weekly record of each respondent’s labour market status (e.g. 
working, out of the labour force) are reported from January 1st 1978. Combining all 
the information, I construct a monthly employment indicator for each individual and 
the duration of unemployment spells. I classify employed in a given month if 
respondents work at least one week in that month.  
Table 3.1 reports the summary statistics of the sample (pooling data for all 
years). Individuals in the sample on average achieve 12.65 years of education. The 
average employment rate is 80.3% with an average unemployment duration of 2.82 




This section describes the identification strategy. The unknown parameters of 
the model are identified in two steps. In the first step, I calibrate some of the parameters 
in X based on findings from the literature. In the second step, I use the numerical 
methods described in Section 3.10 and estimated data generating process for the state 
variables to simulate life cycle profiles for hypothetical individuals. The parameters are 
estimated using Indirect Inference Method by matching a set of moments from the 
NLSY79. 
3.5.1 Pre-determined Parameters 
The values of relative risk aversion coefficient   and the inter-temporal 
discount rate are fixed. I set the coefficient of relative risk aversion equals to 1.5, 
taken from Low et al. (2005), whose model of consumption also allows for non-
separable labour supply. Following Kaplan (2012),  is set to be 0.964 on a monthly 
basis. The replacement rate of UI benefit, , is fixed as 0.5, reflecting the average 
replacement rate of the current US unemployment insurance program. The maximum 
(M) and minimum amount (m) of weekly UI benefits are set as $450 and $45. The 
monthly maximum value of payment for universal means-tested program, is set as $649, 
assuming a household size of four. The detailed setting of Social Security can be found 
in Appendix A. Finally, I set the interest factor as r = 0.016 on an annual basis and 
assume a life-span of 50 years with the last 10 years in compulsory retirement. 
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3.5.2 Internally Estimated Parameters 
Identification of the remaining structural parameters of interest 
(  ) is achieved by Indirect Inference (see 
Gourieroux et al., 1993, Smith, Jr, 1993, and Gallant and Tauchen, 1996). This 
simulation-based estimation method relies on matching moments from auxiliary model, 
estimated on both real and simulated data, generated using the decision rules and other 
equations of motion described by the life-cycle model. Parameter of interests are 
chosen to minimise the distance between the moments of the auxiliary model estimated 
from the observed data and the moments of the auxiliary model estimated from the 
simulated data. The closer the link between the moments of the auxiliary equations and 
the structural parameters, the more reliable is the estimation. 
To provide credible identification of the parameters, auxiliary moments are 
selected to reflect individuals’ choices: how much to consume, whether to quit if 
employed, whether to search for jobs and whether to accept the arriving job offer if 
unemployed. Since age is an important factor in the labour supply behaviours, I choose 
auxiliary moments conditional individuals’ age group. Table 3.1 in Appendix C 
describe the auxiliary model parameters and link these parameters to the identification 
of the life-cycle model. 
The adopted auxiliary model contains 44 one-parameter sub-models that are 
sufficient to identify all parameters. Following Low and Pistaferri (2015), the indirect 
inference estimator of the parameters of the life-cycle model is defined as 
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where   denotes the vector of auxiliary model parameter estimates obtained from the 
real data, and    denotes the auxiliary model parameters estimated using the 
simulated data with parameter value . The diagonal weighting matrix  has diagonal 
elements equal to the inverse of the variance of each of the auxiliary model parameters, 
estimated using bootstrapping with clustering at the individual level. Standard errors 
are obtained using the formula provided by Gourieroux et al. (1993).  
3.5.3 Indirect Inference Results 
In this section, I present the results on the moments matched by Indirect 
Inference and estimates of the structural parameters. Targeted moments are divided 
into five panels: wage moments, flows into and out of employment, employment rates, 
and unemployment duration. Details of the moments are in Table 3.4. 
Figure 3.1 shows the life-cycle profile of the hourly wage rate. On average, 
hourly wage rate increases 30 percent from age group 23 to 30 to age group 31 to 35 
but drops to 16% for every five-year age gap until age 50, and further slows down to 
7% from age 50 to 55. The auxiliary moments of log hourly wage rates are very closely 
replicated by the simulated moments for all age groups. However, the effects of 
education and working experiences on hourly wage rate are lower in the data than in 
the simulation, but qualitatively the effects are similar.  
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In Figure 3.2, I examine the flows into employment from unemployment by age. 
These moments capture individuals’ willingness to take-up job offers and exit from 
unemployment. The model predicts higher take-up rate than the data, indicating a 
smaller disutility in employment. However, the model captures the general trend: the 
likelihood to transit from unemployment into employment decreases with age, 
reflecting the volatility of the early career.  
Figure 3.3 reports the flows into unemployment by age. In the model, there are 
two channels for unemployment: involuntary layoff and voluntary quits of exiting jobs. 
In the data, quits are infrequent since a worker would not be eligible for benefits. The 
model simulates the flows from employment into unemployment well for age group 23 
to 35 but over estimate for age group 36 to 50.  
Figure 3.4 compares the data and the model employment rate over the working 
age. Overall, the fit is good, capturing the light increase in employment in ages 25 – 36 
and the subsequent drop for older ages. Young workers in the model have relatively 
lower levels of assets while older workers have relatively high levels of savings, some 
of which were accumulated for precautionary reasons against unemployment and 
income shocks. Therefore, towards retirement, workers who become unemployed by 
an exogenous shock tend to reject job offers and receive unemployment benefits for six 
months. The results are consistent with the observations of Michelacci and Ruffo 
(2015), Setty (2017) that moral hazard increases with age. 
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Figure 3.6 describes the distribution of unemployment duration in the model 
relative to the data. The model performs reasonably well in matching the relative 
moments for age 23 to 35 but underestimate the unemployment durations for older age. 
In Table 3.2, I report the Indirect Inference parameter estimates corresponding 
to these moments. Individuals with at least 12 years of education earns on average 37% 
more in hourly wage rate. Wage increases with age, reflecting the accumulated returns 
to human capital. I estimate that job is destroyed on average every 26 quarters. 
Individual search productivity decreases with age but increases with education.  
3.5.4 Implications and External Fit of the Model 
In this section, I discuss the implications of the estimates for the unemployment 
insurance and the extent of self-insurance. I compare predictions of the model with 
evidence from the predominantly reduced form literature. This is a way to verify that 
the model can reproduce statistics about the UI program that were not explicitly 
targeted by the estimation procedure (external validity). 
The reduced form literature on UI has analysed the incentive costs of UI by 
looking at a number of behavioural response, particularly the elasticity of the hazard 
rate with respect to benefits.  Since employment is associated with disutility, worker’s 
employment decision is driven by the tension between enjoying higher consumption 
when employed and exerting an effort that reduces their utility. The elasticity of the 
hazard rate with respect to benefits captures this tension. The higher the elasticity, the 
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more sensitive workers are to unemployment benefits. The elasticity is calculated as 
the change in the hazard rate in responses to a change in the replacement rate of UI 
benefits. Two recent studies using SIPP data show that the elasticity is -0.53 for Chetty 
(2008) and -0.36 for Michelacci and Ruffo (2015). In my model, this elasticity is at the 
lower end of this range of estimates (my estimate is -0.19).  
An important part of the model is individual’s ability to self-insure through 
asset accumulation. In the model, individuals could only accumulate through liquid 
assets while in the data individuals could have both liquidity financial wealth as well 
as illiquid assets. Therefore, I do not match moments using the asset data. Figure 3.7 
shows the life-cycle asset profile of both data and the simulation. The simulation in 
general captures well the asset accumulation especially around retirement. In addition 
to asset, consumption is another important measurement of welfare. Unfortunately, 
NLSY79 do not provide consumption information and there I could not match the 
consumption profile from actual data. Figure 3.8 describes the life-cycle consumption 
where it shows a clear hump shape, consistent with the literature. 
3.6 Unemployment Insurance Savings Account 
The most important use of the structural estimation is the ability to analyse the 
effects on welfare and behaviour of alternative policy designs. In this section, I evaluate 
the effects of combining unemployment insurance savings account with unemployment 
insurance, forming a two-tiered unemployment insurance program. In addition to the 
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existing policy instruments: replacement rate (𝛾𝑈𝐼) and benefit duration, the two-tiered 
program has two extra features: UISA deposit rate (𝜙) and withdraw rate (𝜛).  
The system works as following. Each individual is required to save percent 
of the pre-tax wage income in his UISA during employment. When encounter an 
unemployment spell, the individual would first withdraw from his own UISA. The 
eligibility requirements for UISA withdraw is the same as the eligibility criteria for 
current UI. The amount an individual could withdraw from the UISA during 
unemployment is equal to the current UI benefit ( ). Upon the depletion of the UISA, 
if the individual is still unemployed, he would be eligible for UI and receive it for 
maximum 26 weeks.  
UISA earns a market rate of return on existing balances and becomes available 
to individuals upon retirement. The balance of UISA is subjective to an upper bound of 
. The balance of UISA is computed as:  
. 




At the first period of retirement, the remaining balance of UISA is available to the 
individual and becomes part of the assets.  
3.6.1 UISA Deposit Rate 
In the first experiment, I consider the effects of varying UISA deposit rates. 
Focusing on the transition from unemployment to employment, a worker who has a job 
offer faces several disincentives to accept job offers. First, accepting the offer is 
associated with disutility from work. Second, the worker could enjoy unemployment 
benefit while unemployed. Third, a worker who experiences a low-income draw may 
wait for a better draw, similar to the basic McCall search model. Table 3.3 displays 
statistics by age group for monthly income, UISA amount, unemployment duration, 
employment rate and probability transit into employment conditional on being 
unemployed the last period for three levels of deposit rates: 𝜙 = 0, 1% and 4%.  
Compare the life-cycle income profiles, the two-tiered unemployment 
insurance program does not have much effects. Compared to the baseline scenario (𝜙 
= 0), the two-tiered program significantly increase the employment rate and reduces 
the unemployment duration for age 23 to 45. Workers who are 46 years old and above 
would stay longer in unemployment. The results indicate two effects of the two-tiered 
program: (i) it effectively reduces moral hazard costs associated with the traditional 
unemployment insurance and encourage labour participation especially for the younger 
workers; (ii) it might encourage early retirement of older workers who experience an 
unemployment spell given the high amount accumulated in individual UISA. 
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I also analyse the consumption decisions of workers and how these decisions 
are affected by different levels of UISA deposit rates. As Figure 3.6 shows, there is a 
little difference in the life-cycle profile of average monthly consumption between the 
baseline and the alternative program. Under the two-tiered program, workers consume 
less from age 23 to 50 but enjoy higher consumption from age 50 and onwards. 
Compared with worker from the baseline, workers enjoy, on average $200 less each 
month in age 23 to 50, and on average $300 more from age 51 to 55. The results indicate 
that the two-tiered program facilitate a better transfer of resources over the life-cycle. 
On average, the two-tiered unemployment insurance program increase the overall 
welfare by 1% over age groups. Increasing the UISA deposit rate from 1% to 4% does 
not change the welfare measurement much. 
3.6.2 Generosity of the Two-tiered Program 
In addition to the deposit rate, another important feature of the UISA is the 
withdraw rate. Earlier literature has shown that changes in the replacement rate of the 
UI have significant effects on individuals’ labour supply choices. In this section, I 
investigate the effects of alternating the generosity of the program by varying 
replacement rate. To compare with the results from first experiment, I set the deposit 
rate at 4% and vary the replacement rate. Table 3.4 displays statistics by age group for 
income, unemployment duration, employment rate, average UISA amount and 
percentage transit into employment conditional on being unemployed the last period 
for three levels of replacement rate.   
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Comparing the life-cycle income profiles, workers earn less from age 36 and 
above under a more generous two-tiered insurance program but not differences from 
age 23 to 35. Compared with workers with a replacement rate of 50%, workers on 
average earn $200 less each month from age 36 to 45 and $800 less each month from 
age 46 to 62. The results could be explained by the loss of working experiences which 
lead to lower human capital returns. The findings on employment rate and 
unemployment duration support the same argument. Under a more generous program, 
workers are less likely to accept job offers and have a longer unemployment duration. 
Figure 3.7 shows the monthly consumption level under different levels of program 
generosity. Workers end to enjoy a lower consumption level from age 23 to 45 under a 
less generous program but enjoy a higher consumption level from age 46 to 62.  
Combining the results from Table 3.3, it shows that a less generous two-tiered 
unemployment insurance program could effectively reduce the moral hazard costs and 
increases labour participation especially for the young workers without compromising 
much of the consumption. A generous two-tiered unemployment insurance program 
harms total welfare not only by reducing consumption but also the life-cycle incomes. 
The findings are consistent with Schmieder et al (2012, 2013) that prolonged 
unemployment spell induced by high UI benefits could leads to decline in earnings. 
3.7 Conclusion 
In this paper, I study the effects of an alternative unemployment insurance using 
a life-cycle framework. One of the major concerns for providing unemployment 
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insurance is the associated moral hazard costs. Individuals stay unemployed longer 
because of lower costs of unemployment. The UISA is a mandatory individual savings 
accounts that can be used only during unemployment or retirement. Combining the 
UISA and the UI would both provide insurance and reduce moral hazard costs. 
I empirically evaluate the proposed two-tiered unemployment insurance system 
through a life-cycle model, which allows individual savings, labour supply and job 
search intensities under non-separable preferences. The simulations show that the two-
tiered unemployment insurance program effectively reduces moral hazard behaviours 
by reducing the unemployment duration and increasing employment rate. The UISA 
helps to foster long-term saving by reducing consumption for younger workers and 
increasing for the older. Compared to the existing unemployment insurance, the two-










Table 3.1 Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean 
Age (years) 32.43  
(9.93) 







Employed 0.803  
(0.398) 
Unemployed 0.054  
(0.226) 
Non-employed 0.147  
(0.354) 
Assets (USD) 27,487.3  
(42,046.5) 
% Married 0.40  
(0.490) 
Hourly wage rate (USD) 9.14  
(9.48) 









Table 3.2 Estimated Parameters 
Parameter Estimates 
Panel A: Wage Equations   
Intercept -7.61 
Age 0.1409436 
Age square -0.1661994 
Education >= 12 years 0.368478 
Working experience 0.0045 
S.D for permanent productivity shock 0.09 
S.D for transitory productivity shock 0.004 
Panel B: Preference and Labor Market   
Disutility or working -1.5 
Job destruction rate 0.03 
Panel C: Search Productivity   
Intercept 0.090514 
Age 0.0433493 
Age square -0.065403 
Education >= 12 years 0.0246287 
 
Table 3.3 Moments for Deposit Rates 
 
𝝓= 0 𝝓 = 1% 𝝓 = 4% 
Age[23,30] 
   
Income ($K) 1.684 1.646 1.571 
UISA Amount ($K) - 0.585 1.771 
Unemployment 
Duration 
3.628 3.314 3.259 
Employment Rate 0.868 0.871 0.883 
Probability of transiting 
into employment given 
unemployed at t-1 
0.261 0.271 0.276 
Age[31,35] 
   
Income ($K) 2.893 2.912 2.839 
UISA Amount ($K) - 1.019 1.79 
Unemployment 
Duration 
3.804 3.158 2.525 
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𝝓= 0 𝝓 = 1% 𝝓 = 4% 
Employment Rate 0.888 0.918 0.919 
Probability of transiting 
into employment given 
unemployed at t-1 
0.267 0.306 0.365 
Age[36,40] 
   
Income ($K) 4.14 4.258 4.047 
UISA Amount ($K) - 1.019 1.95 
Unemployment 
Duration 
3.433 3.401 2.71 
Employment Rate 0.87 0.907 0.918 
Probability of transiting 
into employment given 
unemployed at t-1 
0.276 0.305 0.354 
Age[41,45] 
   
Income ($K) 5.235 5.596 5.399 
UISA Amount ($K) - 1.376 2.095 
Unemployment 
Duration 
3.857 3.445 3.749 
Employment Rate 0.815 0.903 0.906 
Probability of transiting 
into employment given 
unemployed at t-1 
0.308 0.294 0.284 
Age[46,50] 
   
Income ($K) 6.238 6.499 6.531 
UISA Amount ($K) - 0.822 2.077 
Unemployment 
Duration 
3.321 3.266 3.483 
Employment Rate 0.851 0.766 0.866 
Probability of transiting 
into employment given 
unemployed at t-1 
0.274 0.277 0.251 
Age[51,55] 
   
Income ($K) 6.924 7.018 7.047 
UISA Amount ($K) - 0.747 1.244 
Unemployment 
Duration 
3.219 3.266 3.419 
Employment Rate 0.821 0.793 0.643 
Probability of transiting 
into employment given 
unemployed at t-1 
0.299 0.282 0.242 
Age[56,62] 
   
Income ($K) 6.667 6.721 6.354 
UISA Amount ($K) - 0.237 0.674 
Unemployment 
Duration 
7.786 3.897 9.479 
Employment Rate 0.421 0.549 0.383 
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𝝓= 0 𝝓 = 1% 𝝓 = 4% 
Probability of transiting 
into employment given 
unemployed at t-1 
0.122 0.221 0.111 
 
Table 3.4 Moments for Replacement Rates 
 
replacement 
rate = 40% 
replacement 
rate = 50% 
replacement 
rate = 60% 
Age[23,30] 
   
Income ($K) 1.622 1.571 1.619 
UISA Amount ($K) 1.727 1.771 1.748 
Unemployment Duration 3.737 3.259 4.816 
Employment Rate 0.855 0.883 0.832 
Probability of transiting into 
employment given 
unemployed at t-1 
0.231 0.276 0.185 
Age[31,35] 
   
Income ($K) 2.859 2.839 2.837 
UISA Amount ($K) 1.845 1.79 1.6 
Unemployment Duration 3.564 2.525 6.213 
Employment Rate 0.911 0.919 0.826 
Probability of transiting into 
employment given 
unemployed at t-1 
0.269 0.365 0.149 
Age[36,40] 
   




rate = 40% 
replacement 
rate = 50% 
replacement 
rate = 60% 
UISA Amount ($K) 1.936 1.95 1.699 
Unemployment Duration 3.936 2.71 6.384 
Employment Rate 0.901 0.918 0.825 
Probability of transiting into 
employment given 
unemployed at t-1 
0.279 0.354 0.152 
Age[41,45] 
   
Income ($K) 5.498 5.399 4.955 
UISA Amount ($K) 2.088 2.095 1.805 
Unemployment Duration 3.145 3.749 9.187 
Employment Rate 0.908 0.906 0.798 
Probability of transiting into 
employment given 
unemployed at t-1 
0.278 0.284 0.108 
Age[46,50] 
   
Income ($K) 6.379 6.531 5.901 
UISA Amount ($K) 1.617 2.077 1.49 
Unemployment Duration 3.848 3.483 3.68 
Employment Rate 0.768 0.866 0.742 
Probability of transiting into 
employment given 
unemployed at t-1 
0.264 0.251 0.289 
Age[51,55] 




rate = 40% 
replacement 
rate = 50% 
replacement 
rate = 60% 
Income ($K) 6.894 7.047 6.134 
UISA Amount ($K) 1.678 1.244 1.106 
Unemployment Duration 3.753 3.419 3.969 
Employment Rate 0.716 0.643 0.64 
Probability of transiting into 
employment given 
unemployed at t-1 
0.194 0.242 0.252 
Age[56,62] 
   
Income ($K) 6.021 6.354 5.432 
UISA Amount ($K) 0.258 0.674 0.348 
Unemployment Duration 8.825 9.479 5.506 
Employment Rate 0.204 0.383 0.334 
Probability of transiting into 
employment given 
unemployed at t-1 








Table 3.5 Targeted Moments 
Mean of: Observed Simulated 
Panel A: The Log Wage Function     
Log wage | Age [23,30] -4.86 -4.599 
  (0.006)   
Log wage | Age [31,35] -4.49 -4.016 
  (0.008)   
Log wage | Age [36,40] -4.235 -3.659 
  (0.01)   
Log wage | Age [41,45] -4.072 -3.407 
  (0.012)   
Log wage | Age [46,50] -3.921 -3.239 
  (0.013)   
Log wage | Age [51,55] -3.853 -3.148 
  (0.02)   
Log wage | High exp -3.909 -3.4004 
  (0.011)   
Log wage | High educ -4.553 -3.551 
  (0.007)   
Variance of log wage 0.646 0.428 
Panel B: Flows into Employment     
Full-time employment | Age [23,30] & 
Unemp. at t-1 
0.126 
0.271 
  (0.002)   
Full-time employment | Age [31,35] & 
Unemp. at t-1 
0.097 
0.287 
  (0.003)   
Full-time employment | Age [36,40] & 
Unemp. at t-1 
0.083 
0.282 
  (0.003)   
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Mean of: Observed Simulated 
Full-time employment | Age [41,45] & 
Unemp. at t-1 
0.067 
0.298 
  (0.003)   
Full-time employment | Age [46,50] & 
Unemp. at t-1 
0.05 
0.264 
  (0.002)   
Full-time employment | Age [51,55] & 
Unemp. at t-1 
0.04 
0.296 
  (0.003)   
Panel C: Flows into Unemployment     




  (0.004)   




  (0.004)   




  (0.004)   




  (0.004)   




  (0.005)   




  (0.007)   
Panel D: Employment Status     
Full-time employment | Age [23,30] 0.838 0.878 
  (0.003)   
Full-time employment | Age [31,35] 0.862 0.905 
  (0.004)   
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Mean of: Observed Simulated 
Full-time employment | Age [36,40] 0.869 0.867 
  (0.004)   
Full-time employment | Age [41,45] 0.848 0.814 
  (0.005)   
Full-time employment | Age [46,50] 0.809 0.847 
  (0.005)   
Full-time employment | Age [51,55] 0.771 0.824 
  (0.009)   
Panel E: Unemployment Duration     
Unemployment Duration | Age [23,30] 3.045 3.628 
  (0.127)   
Unemployment Duration | Age [31,35] 3.767 3.804 
  (0.319)   
Unemployment Duration | Age [36,40] 4.998 3.433 
  (0.761)   
Unemployment Duration | Age [41,45] 4.875 3.857 
  (0.854)   
Unemployment Duration | Age [46,50] 7.256 3.321 
  (1.110)   
Unemployment Duration | Age [51,55] 8.168 3.219 







Figure 3.1 Life-cycle profile of Hourly Wage Rate 
 








































Figure 3.3 Distribution of Flows into Unemployment from Employment 
 





















































Figure 3.5 Unemployment Duration 
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